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ADDICTION, GENETICS, AND CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
STEPHEN J. MORSE* 
It is clear that genes build proteins, but God only knows what happens next . . . .  If you 
want to know how the mind works, you should investigate the mind; not the brain, and 
still less the genome. . . .1 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
An immense proportion of alleged felons are under the influence of mind-
altering substances when they are arrested, and many people arrested for drug 
offenses and other crimes are addicted.2  Indeed, possession and use of illicit 
substances, which are necessary criteria of addiction,3 are crimes in every state 
and under federal law.  Assessing the moral and legal responsibility of agents 
who engage in such behavior is thus of paramount importance in our criminal 
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 1. Jerry Fodor, Crossed Wires, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, May 16, 2003 at 3. 
 2. See ZHIWEI ZHANG, NAT’L OPINION RES. CENTER, DRUG AND ALCOHOL USE AND 
RELATED MATTERS AMONG ARRESTEES tbls. 3, 9 & 10 (2003) (showing that 73.9% of male adult 
arrestees in thirty-nine cities tested positive for alcohol or at least one of nine controlled substances, 
that 37% had engaged in the heavy use of controlled substances and 39.1% were at risk for drug 
dependence, and that 47.9% had engaged in heavy drinking within the past thirty days and 28.6% were 
at risk for alcohol dependence).  I recognize that there is no consensual, scientifically or clinically 
operationalized definition of “addiction” and that the diagnostic and statistical manual of the American 
Psychiatric Association uses the terms “substance dependence” and “substance abuse” to refer to 
substance-related disorders.  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed., text rev. 2000).  Toward the extremes of drug use behavior, however, 
addiction could be characterized as Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart characterized “hard core” 
pornography: Even if we can’t define it, we know it when we see it.  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 
197 (1964).  For ease of exposition, the term addiction will be used throughout the paper.  Also for ease 
of exposition, addictions will be treated as limited to substance-related problems.  Many believe that 
addictions encompass nonsubstance activities, such as gambling, and there is research evidence 
supporting this position.  See Jon E. Grant et al, Multicenter Investigation of the Opioid Antagonist 
Nalmefene in the Treatment of Pathological Gambling, 163 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 303 (2006) (finding that 
an opioid antagonist successfully reduces the symptoms associated with pathological gambling, 
suggesting that the disorder is not about gambling but about addiction in general).  This position 
remains controversial, however, and arguing for it is unnecessary for the purposes of the present paper. 
 3. See Eric J. Nestler, Genes and Addiction, 26 NATURE GENETICS 277, 277 (2000) (“Drug 
addiction . . . is defined solely in behavioural terms.  For example, addiction can be considered . . . 
compulsive drug-seeking and -taking despite horrendous consequences.”).  This definition is discussed 
further infra. 
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justice system.  But understanding the moral and legal responsibility of people 
for becoming addicted and for criminal conduct associated with their addictions 
has unfortunately been hindered by inadequate understanding of how 
explanatory models of addiction relate to responsibility.  Even sophisticated 
people tend to think that the “man with the golden arm” is somehow an 
automaton, a puppet pulled by the narcotic strings of a biological disease, and 
that therefore the addict is not responsible for actions associated with his 
addiction.  Evidence linking a genetic predisposition for this condition 
contributes powerfully, often confusingly, to this type of thinking.4  Conversely, 
many people think that addiction is purely a result of moral weakness.  The 
various characterizations of addiction may be striking and contain a grain of 
truth, and many models have great heuristic power.  For the law’s purposes, 
however, the metaphors and models often obscure rather than clarify issues of 
criminal responsibility and of social policy generally in response to the deviant 
behavior many addicts exhibit. 
This article has two simple underlying theses.  The first is that it is 
impossible to understand the relation of any variable to criminal responsibility 
without having in place an account of criminal responsibility.  The second is that 
discovery of genetic or of any other physical or psychosocial cause of action 
raises no new issues concerning responsibility, and discovery of such causes 
does not per se create an excusing or mitigating condition for criminal conduct 
or any other type of behavior. 
This article begins in Part II with a brief description of the phenomenology 
of addiction, describing generally what is known about the behavioral aspects of 
addiction in addition to the basic criteria of craving, seeking, and using.  
Thinking sensibly about the relation of addiction to criminal responsibility is 
impossible unless it is first understood that this condition is “defined solely in 
behavioural terms.”5  Part III addresses the contrast between the legal and 
scientific images of behavior, using the disease concept of addiction, now fueled 
by discoveries of genetic predisposition, as a prime example of the contrast. 
Part IV offers a general model of criminal responsibility to guide the 
analysis of responsibility for addiction-related criminal behavior, offering the 
best positive account of the present system.  The model’s essential criteria are 
behavioral, broadly understood to refer to actions and mental states.  Part V 
deals with persistent confusions about responsibility.  Part VI describes those 
aspects of addiction, if any, for which persons might be held morally or legally 
responsible, concluding that only actions related to addiction are appropriate 
objects for ascribing criminal responsibility.  Part VII addresses the causal role 
genetics plays in explaining addiction.  This discussion is deferred until this 
 
 4. See generally Johannes Keller, In Genes We Trust: The Biological Component of Psychological 
Essentialism and Its Relationship to Mechanisms of Motivated Social Cognition, 88 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 686 (2005) (validating a scale to measure the belief in genetic determinism and 
demonstrating that such a belief affects social cognition). 
 5. Nestler, supra note 3, at 277. 
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point because, as earlier parts explain, no particular causal explanation of any 
behavior, including a biological explanation, entails necessary legal 
consequences.  In particular, the existence of a genetic explanation for addiction 
does not demonstrate that addicts are not acting when they seek and use 
substances or engage in other activities related to their addiction and a genetic 
explanation produces no necessary legal conclusion concerning responsibility 
for such addiction-related actions. 
Finally, Part VIII considers individual and social responsibility for the 
addiction-related actions.  It begins by discussing in detail the meaning of those 
features of addiction—subjective craving and compulsion—that seem the most 
likely predicates for excuse or mitigation.  It argues that understanding the 
biological roots of craving does not yet yield valid information concerning the 
strength of craving and seemingly compulsive behavior.  This part next 
addresses the two leading theoretical and legal candidates for an excusing 
condition—internal coercion and lack of the capacity for rationality.  It 
concludes that most addicts should be responsible for most criminal behavior 
motivated by addiction, but that addiction can in some cases affect the agent’s 
ability “to grasp and be guided by reason.”6  The last section of this part 
considers whether society is responsible for addiction-related actions.  It 
concludes that even if most addicts should be held responsible for addiction-
related behavior, sensible social policy can do much to reduce both the 
prevalence of addiction and concomitant criminal behavior.  The final part of 
the paper discusses three legal proposals for reducing the costs associated with 
addictions and for treating addicts fairly. 
The paper throughout makes the simplifying assumption that addicts are not 
responsible for becoming addicted.  If the addict is responsible for becoming 
addicted, then it is less problematic to hold the addict responsible for the 
foreseeable and unforeseeable consequences of becoming addicted.7  As 
everyone concedes, becoming addicted virtually always involves intentional 
action.  The addict must have intentionally used the substance, usually for 
prolonged periods.  If the addict is responsible for substance use, then, 
arguably, she is also responsible for setting in motion those mechanistic, 
biophysical processes that partially cause addiction and that are activated or 
potentiated by using substances.  The relation of genetic or other biological 
causation to responsibility then becomes much less important and interesting.  
Consequently, to raise the issues most starkly and most sympathetically to the 
 
 6. This felicitous phrase is borrowed from Jay Wallace’s superb book on responsibility.  R. JAY 
WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS (1994).  Wallace treats the phrase as 
encompassing both rationality and control defects.  I prefer to limit it to the former, however, and will 
suggest that most control defects can be assimilated to rationality defects. 
 7. See, e.g., Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (upholding the constitutionality of a state 
statute excluding evidence of intoxication relevant to whether the defendant in fact had the subjective 
mens rea required by the definition of the crime).  I firmly reject such partial or complete strict liability, 
but it is a common feature of the criminal law.  See Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger, Flight from 
Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 250, 254 (1998). 
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view that biological causation may play an excusing role, it is assumed that 
addicts are not responsible for becoming addicted.  This assumption is relaxed 
primarily in Part VIII.B, which discusses whether addicts should be excused 
because addiction compromises their rational capacities.  A postscript considers 
in detail whether addicts are responsible for becoming addicted. 
II 
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ADDICTION 
Here, in common-sense terms, is what we know about the phenomenology 
of addiction.8  A later section considers in detail attempts to define more 
precisely some of the key terms, such as “craving” and “compulsive.” 
Some people use substances for which they develop an extremely intense, 
insistent level of subjective desire that is apparently satisfied only temporarily 
by use.  After the addict satisfies the craving by use, the desire to use substances 
quickly reasserts itself and the agent again desires to use very intensely.  
Addicts typically engage in repetitive seeking and using behavior, even though 
the drug-related actions threaten and often cause adverse, frequent, and 
horrendous social, health, and legal consequences.  Addicts have very good 
long-term reasons not to engage in drug seeking and use, but they tend to be 
steep time discounters when they evaluate drug seeking and using.  For some, 
use may be rational in the short-term.  Addicts do not seem to learn from 
experience, however.  Thus, many continue to use and to imperil their lives.  
Most are ambivalent about their addictions.  For some, the craving is so strong 
that seeking and using the substance becomes a central life activity and even 
central to the addict’s identity.  Many, and perhaps most, who quit will relapse, 
especially if the “drug life” has compromised functional social networks and 
skills. 
It can be inferred from the addict’s report about his or her own thoughts and 
feelings and from the negative consequences of addiction-related actions that 
the addict is driven by an overwhelming or overpowering desire termed 
“craving” and that drug seeking and using are “compulsive.”  But the 
environment and expectations play a weighty role in the addict’s experience of 
craving and use.  Addiction is a condition that is eliminated by large numbers of 
craving sufferers simply by intentionally ceasing to seek and use, and many 
cease craving after they quit.  In many cases, the addict is able to quit because 
she finally has sufficient reason to do so, and many addicts “age out” of 
addiction.  Even if addiction is properly and most usefully characterized as a 
disease, at the extreme its necessary behavioral signs are virtually all reward-
sensitive or reason-responsive.  An addict threatened with instant death for 
 
 8. What follows in this part is boilerplate among addiction researchers.  Support can be found in 
the many scientific studies of addiction cited in this article and in many first-person accounts of 
addiction.  Part VIII.A., infra, addresses attempts by scientists to define craving and compulsion more 
precisely. 
07__MORSE.DOC 9/8/2006  3:52 PM 
Winter/Spring 2006] ADDICTION, GENETICS, AND RESPONSIBILITY 169 
seeking and using will not seek and use unless she already wishes to die at that 
moment or does not care if she does.9 
III 
IMAGES OF ADDICTION 
The concepts of illness and disease have powerful associations in our 
culture, most of which are inconsistent with the sufferer’s responsibility for the 
features of the illness.  People can, of course, be responsible for initially 
contracting or risking contracting diseases.  A person who is overweight, does 
not exercise, and smokes surely is responsible for risking hypertension; the 
person who in inappropriate circumstances engages in unprotected sexual 
activity surely risks contracting sexually transmitted diseases.  And a person 
who suffers from many diseases can ameliorate the consequences by 
intentionally adhering to a prescribed medical regimen.  But hypertension and 
infections are themselves mechanisms.  The sufferer cannot terminate all the 
signs and symptoms of the disease simply by intentionally choosing to cease 
being hypertensive or infected. 
Despite the potential contribution of human agency to the cause and 
maintenance of some diseases, no one denies that these are fundamentally 
diseases.  Moreover, with many and perhaps most diseases, the sufferer is not 
responsible for contracting the disease, and for many diseases there is little or 
nothing the sufferer can do to help, other than to seek and cooperate with 
professional help and to wait for the disease to run its course.  Although people 
sometimes can be complicit in their own diseases, the disease model is so 
powerful that people who are ill are not in general considered responsible for 
the signs, symptoms, and consequences.  The dominant image of people with 
diseases is that they are the victims of pathological mechanisms who deserve 
sympathy and help and do not deserve condemnation. 
The brain disease model of addiction borrows heavily from the powerful 
moral and social associations of the general concepts of illness and disease.  It 
claims that addiction is a chronic and relapsing brain disease.10  Supported by 
highly technical anatomical, physiological, and genetic research demonstrating 
that addictions appear to have a biological basis, the brain disease model 
inevitably suggests that the addict is sick.  The signs and symptoms of the 
disease—primarily compulsive drug seeking and use—are seemingly the 
mechanistic consequence of genetically-driven pathological brain anatomy and 
physiology over which the addict has no control once prolonged use has caused 
the pathology.  The following are recent excellent examples of this mode of 
 
 9. The ability of many addicts to decide to quit and to be responsive to contingencies generally is 
an inconvenient fact for those who wish to conceptualize addiction as purely a brain disease.  People do 
not stop being diabetics, for example, simply by deciding that their pancreases should produce more 
natural insulin nor does cancer abate because people have good reason to be free of this terrible 
disease.  See infra Parts III & VI. 
 10. Alan I. Leshner, Addiction Is a Brain Disease, and It Matters, 1 FOCUS 190 (2003). 
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thought that appeared in prestigious journals.  The first is by an eminent 
neuroscientist: 
Dramatic advances over the past two decades in both the neurosciences and the 
behavioral sciences have revolutionized our understanding of drug abuse and 
addiction.  Scientists have identified neural circuits that subsume the actions of every 
known drug of abuse, and they have specified common pathways that are affected by 
almost all such drugs.  Researchers have also identified and cloned the major 
receptors for virtually every abusable drug, as well as the natural ligands for most of 
those receptors.  In addition, they have elaborated many of the biochemical cascades 
within the cell that follow receptor activation by drugs.  Research has also begun to 
reveal major differences between the brains of addicted and nonaddicted individuals 
and to indicate some common elements of addiction, regardless of the substance.11 
The second is by an addiction researcher: 
Addiction is a disorder of the brain’s reward system.  Functional imaging shows the 
vulnerable circuitry for addiction originating in the paleocortex.  Paradoxically, 
humankind’s greatest adaptive advantage, the neocortex, responsible for the 
phenomenon of consciousness, is at best only minimally protective from addictive 
disease and may pose a hurdle for recovery.  Unlike most medical disorders, in 
addiction a net effect of supraphysiologic reward, impaired inhibition, or both 
paradoxically leads the limbic drive system to reinforce exposure to the disease vector.  
This is in direct violation of the principle of survival of the species.  In individuals with 
underlying vulnerabilities, limbic drive progressively recruits neocortical function to 
protect continued access to abused substances, the polar opposite of 
self-preservation.12 
The first example, despite the concession to the behavioral sciences in its first 
sentence, describes solely biological advances, and the remainder of the article 
fails to note one “dramatic advance” in the behavioral understanding of 
addiction.13  The second example treats the intentional conduct of the addict 
solely as the product of brain mechanisms.  There is no person present, no agent 
acting when the “organism” seeks and uses. 
For those whose thinking is driven by the brain disease model, this image is 
applauded and promoted.  For example, an editorial in the American Journal of 
Psychiatry opens as follows: 
American psychiatry has made remarkable progress in recategorizing the addictive 
disorders from moral failures to brain diseases, but the need for community education 
continues.  The concept of moral failure is by no means gone from the discussion of 
addictive disorders, as evidenced by our country’s investment in criminal justice rather 
than treatment . . . .14 
Such thinking can reflect in part battles over turf, funding, and the like, but it is 
doubtlessly sincerely motivated. 
Virtually all mechanistic models of problems that bedevil society, including 
the medical model, are alluring because they imply that there are technical, 
 
 11. Alan I. Leshner, Addiction Is a Brain Disease, and It Matters, 278 SCIENCE 45, 45 (1997). 
 12. David R. Gastfriend, Physician Substance Abuse and Recovery: What Does it Mean for 
Physicians—and Everyone Else, 293 JAMA 1513, 1514 (2005) (citation omitted). 
 13. Leshner, supra note 11. 
 14. Thomas R. Kosten, Addiction as a Brain Disease, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 711, 711 (1998); 
accord Alan I. Leshner, Science is Revolutionizing Our View of Addiction—and What to Do About It, 
156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1 (1999). 
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“clean” solutions.  Fix the “pathological mechanism,” fix the social problem it 
produces; do not worry about refractory human behavior and messy moral 
accountability.  The medical model is used here for rhetorical purposes because 
it is much in the news, and because there is heartening progress in the biological 
understanding of addiction.  But any black-box mechanical model of the 
phenomenon of addiction would have done as well. 
Criminal law’s concept of the person, including the addict, is the antithesis 
of the medical model’s mechanistic concept.  Although all honest people will 
admit that biological and environmental variables beyond the person’s rational 
control can cause an agent to be the type of person who is predisposed to 
commit crimes or can put the agent in the kind of environment that predisposes 
people to criminal activity, the law ultimately views the criminal wrongdoer as 
an agent and not simply as a passive victim who manifests pathological 
mechanisms.15  Unless either the person does not act or an excusing condition is 
present, agency entails moral and legal responsibility that warrants blame and 
punishment.  Suffering from a disease simpliciter, such as schizophrenia, does 
not itself mean that the defendant did not act or that an excusing condition 
obtained, although diseases and other causes may negate action or produce an 
excusing condition, such as gross irrationality.  Most mental and physical 
diseases—even severe disorders—suffered by people who violate the criminal 
law do not have these exculpating effects because they do not sufficiently affect 
rational agency concerning criminal activity.16  Even if addiction is properly 
characterized as an illness, most addicts are nonetheless capable of being guided 
by good reasons, including the incentives law can provide.17  Sick people who 
behave immorally or who violate the criminal law are almost always responsible 
agents. 
Why does it matter if we conceptualize drug-related problems medically as 
the product of genetic predisposition and a brain disease?  After all, drugs 
undoubtedly cause vast and often catastrophic personal and social misery, and 
perhaps the program of research and intervention the biological disease model 
implies can ameliorate the misery.  Why should internecine disputes among 
philosophers of biology and medicine about the status of the disease concept, or 
 
 15. In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), a case involving a chronic alcoholic convicted of being 
drunk in public, the Supreme Court held that a defense of “compulsion symptomatic of a disease” was 
not constitutionally required.  The Court wrote that public drunkenness was behavior, and thus unlike 
the simple status of being addicted, and it refused to hold that criminal blame and punishment were 
constitutionally impermissible under the circumstances.  Indeed, Justice Marshall’s plurality opinion 
observed that it was not irrational to respond to public drunkenness with the criminal sanction.  Id. at 
527–31.  The plurality also pointed out that Powell’s own cross-examination at trial suggested that he 
was not powerless to stop drinking after he had taken his first drink.  Id. at 519–21. 
 16. Mental disorders, even severe mental disorders, seldom negate the act requirement for criminal 
culpability and equally rarely negate either the mens rea required by the definition of crimes or the 
intentionality of unlawful conduct.  See Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Reasons, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 189, 210 (1999) (considering the act requirement); Stephen J. Morse, Craziness and Criminal 
Responsibility, 17 BEHAV. SCI. & L., 147, 161–64 (1999) (concerning mens rea). 
 17. See SALLY L. SATEL & FREDERICK K. GOODWIN, ETHICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., IS DRUG 
ADDICTION A BRAIN DISEASE? 20–21 (1998). 
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the law’s model of the person, or the pure moralizing of many stand in the way?  
They should not, of course; nothing should stand in the way of useful research 
and interventions.  Unfortunately, however, otherwise useful images or models 
can have negative consequences if they exceed their rightful boundaries.  The 
wrong images in an inapt domain can produce misguided policies. 
Whether the law should treat addiction as a disease and what that would 
mean are open conceptual and practical questions.  Let us begin by examining 
the law’s model of responsibility ascription. 
IV 
THE MODEL OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
The criteria for criminal responsibility, like the criteria for addiction, are 
entirely behavioral.  An agent is criminally responsible if his or her intentional 
action, accompanied by an appropriate mental state, satisfies the definition of a 
criminal offense.  If the agent does not act at all because her bodily movement is 
not intentional—for example, a reflex or spasmodic movement—then there is 
no violation of the prohibition.  There is also no violation in cases in which the 
agent’s intentional action satisfies the offense’s act definition, but the mental 
state required by the definition is lacking.  In Anglo-American criminal law, an 
agent unjustifiably violating a criminal prohibition will be held not responsible 
and legally excused if she was incapable of rationality or was metaphorically 
compelled to act by being placed in a “do-it-or-else,” hard-choice situation.18  
Note that in cases of metaphorical compulsion, unlike cases of no action, the 
agent does act intentionally.  Infancy and legal insanity are doctrinal examples 
of rationality excuses; duress is an example of a hard-choice excuse.  The 
criteria for the excusing conditions—lack of rational capacity and sufficiently 
hard choice (compulsion)—are normative.  The degree of rational capacity 
required for responsibility and how hard choices must be to excuse can differ in 
response to changing moral conceptions and material circumstances. 
This account of criminal responsibility is most tightly linked to retributive 
justifications of punishment, which hold that punishment is not justified unless 
the offender morally deserves punishment because the offender was at fault and 
responsible, and that the offender never should be punished more than she 
deserves.  It is generally conceded that desert is at least a necessary 
precondition for punishment in Anglo-American law.19  The account is also 
consistent with consequential justifications for punishment, such as general 
deterrence.  No offender, including an addict, should be punished unless he or 
 
 18. A justification exists if action that would otherwise be criminal is right or permissible under the 
circumstances.  Self-defense is an example.  An excuse exists if the agents acts wrongfully, but the agent 
is not responsible for his or her conduct.  Legal insanity is an example.  See Kent Greenawalt, The 
Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897 (1984) (distinguishing 
justification and excuse and examining the often hazy boundaries between them). 
 19. Exceptions, such as strict liability, are few and highly controversial precisely because they 
permit punishment in the absence of fault. 
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she at least deserves such punishment.  Even if good consequences might be 
achieved by punishing non-responsible addicts or by punishing responsible 
addicts more than they deserve, such punishment would require very weighty 
justification in a system that takes desert seriously. 
This brief description is arguably the most accurate positive account of the 
current, dominant Anglo-American conception of responsibility.  One might 
quibble about details,20 but the basic thesis—that responsibility is based on 
ordinary, common-sense behavioral criteria such as action, mental states, and 
rationality, and that responsibility is tied to desert—is accurate.  Now, many 
people become confused about these criteria when they consider newly 
discovered scientific evidence concerning the causation of behavior or if they 
have more fundamental metaphysical doubts about the legitimacy of criminal 
responsibility and consequent deserved punishment.  As the next part argues, 
such concerns are dangerous distractions that either confuse analysis or prove 
too much by threatening all conceptions of responsibility. 
V 
DANGEROUS DISTRACTIONS CONCERNING RESPONSIBILITY 
A persistent but confused (and confusing) thought is that discovery of 
genetic or other biological causes implicates the free will versus determinism 
debate, and, relatedly, that causation is per se an excusing condition.21  That 
determinism threatens responsibility is a truism.  Although no one can know if 
determinism or something close to it is true, let us assume that it is.  After all, 
the universe is massively regular above the sub-atomic level, and it would be 
strange indeed if the phenomena of the universe were mostly or entirely 
random or indeterministic.22 
The alleged incompatibility of determinism and responsibility is 
foundational.  Determinism is not a continuum concept that applies to various 
individuals in various degrees.  There is no partial or selective determinism.  
Responsibility is possible or it is not, tout court, if the universe is deterministic.  
If human beings are fully subject to the causal laws of the universe, as a 
thoroughly physicalist, naturalist worldview holds, then many philosophers 
 
 20. For example, there is a debate about whether justified conduct violates a moral or criminal 
prohibition.  Some argue that justifiable conduct violates no prima facie obligation.  See MICHAEL 
MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 31–33, 64–67 (1997) 
(arguing that justification should be treated as part of the “special part” of the criminal law).  A more 
formalistic criminal law analysis holds that justified conduct does violate a prima facie criminal 
prohibition, but ultimately the conduct is judged right or at least permissible.  In either case, illicit drug 
activity is almost never justified under current legal doctrine. 
 21. See, e.g., Comm. on Addictions of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Responsibility 
and Choice in Addiction, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 707, 708 (2002) (pointing to genetic and biological 
factors responsible for addiction and suggesting that partial determinism or causation provides a partial 
excuse). 
 22. Galen Strawson calls this assumption the “realism constraint.”  Galen Strawson, Consciousness, 
Free Will, and the Unimportance of Determinism, 32 INQUIRY 3, 12 (1989).  If the universe were 
indeterministic or random, it would hardly provide a secure foundation for responsibility. 
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claim that “ultimate” responsibility is impossible from the start.23  On the other 
hand, plausible “compatibilist” theories suggest that responsibility is possible in 
a deterministic universe.24  There seems no resolution to this debate in sight, but 
our moral and legal practices do not treat everyone or no one as responsible.  
Determinism cannot be guiding our practices.  If one wants to excuse addicts 
because they are genetically determined or determined for any other reason to 
be addicts, one is committed to negating the possibility of responsibility for 
anything. 
Our criminal responsibility criteria and practices have nothing to do with 
determinism or with the necessity of having so-called “free will.”  Criminal 
responsibility involves evaluation of intentional, conscious, and potentially 
rational human action.  And almost no one in the debate about determinism 
and free will or responsibility argues that we are not conscious, intentional, 
potentially rational creatures when we act.  We may be deterministically caused 
to be the type of creature that acts intentionally, but determinism is not 
inconsistent conceptually or logically with the possibility of mind-brain 
causation of behavior.  The truth of determinism does not entail that actions 
and non-actions are indistinguishable and that there is no distinction between 
rational and non-rational actions or compelled and uncompelled actions.  
Children are less rational than adults; most people most of the time do not act 
under severe threats.  Our current responsibility concepts and practices use 
criteria consistent with and independent of determinism. 
A related confusion is that once a non-intentional causal explanation has 
been identified for action, the person must be excused.  In other words, the 
claim is that causation and responsibility are inconsistent and that causation per 
se is an excusing condition.  This is sometimes called the “causal theory of 
excuse.”  Thus, if one identifies genetic, neurophysiological, or other causes for 
behavior, then allegedly the person is not responsible.  In a thoroughly physical 
world, however, this claim is either identical to the incompatibilist critique of 
responsibility and furnishes a foundational critique of all responsibility, or it is 
simply an error.  I term this the “fundamental psycholegal error” because it is 
erroneous and, indeed, incoherent as a description of our practices.25  Non-
causation of behavior is not and could not be a criterion for responsibility 
because all behaviors, like all other phenomena, are caused.  Causation, even by 
abnormal physical variables, is not per se an excusing condition.  Abnormal 
physical variables, such as neurotransmitter deficiencies, may cause a genuine 
excusing condition, such as the lack of rational capacity, but then the lack of 
 
 23. See, e.g., DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL (2001). 
 24. See WALLACE, supra note 6; Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 437–44 (2004). 
 25. Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587 (1994).  Critics complain 
that this argument is repeated in many of my writings.  I plead guilty to the charge and will continue to 
recidivate as long as people continue to manifest the confusion, as they routinely do.  See Comm. on 
Addictions, supra note 21, and Anders Kaye, Resurrecting the Causal Theory of the Excuses, 83 NEB. L. 
REV. 1116 (2005), for recent examples. 
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rational capacity, not causation, is doing the excusing work.  If causation were 
an excuse, no one would be responsible for any action.  Unless proponents of 
the causal theory of excuse can furnish a convincing reason why causation per 
se excuses, we have no reason to jettison responsibility practices that use other 
criteria for responsibility and excuse. 
In short, the burden of persuasion is on critics of the positive account of 
responsibility that has been offered to guide our thinking about responsibility 
and addiction.  They must show either that it is an inaccurate account or that 
our entire system of blame and punishment is normatively indefensible.  Until 
they accomplish this, they must work within the model.  There can be 
disagreement about how much lack of rational capacity excuses or how hard 
choices must be to excuse, but determinism and causation are simply dangerous 
distractions. 
VI 
ASPECTS OF ADDICTION; OBJECTS OF RESPONSIBILITY 
Roughly speaking, addiction has four associated aspects or phenomena that 
might be objects of responsibility ascription: anatomical states, physiological 
states, psychological states, and actions.26  Among these, only action is a 
potentially appropriate object of moral and legal responsibility ascription and a 
justification for criminal punishment.27  For the most part, people are held 
morally and legally responsible only for actions that are capable of being guided 
by reason.  Although anatomical and physiological states, including one’s 
genetic make-up, may be evaluated as desirable or undesirable, they are 
entirely or largely the product of mechanistic processes that are not under the 
agent’s rational control.  Those anatomical and physiological states that are 
signs of addiction are simply statuses of the agent’s physical body and not 
directly controllable through the person’s rational agency.  Similarly, a 
psychological state that is symptomatic of addiction, such as craving (or, 
according to many, ambivalence), is likewise just a status that is mechanistically 
produced by the underlying anatomical or physiological states associated with 
addiction and, in many cases, by environmental cues.  Anatomical, 
physiological, and psychological states are not intentional human actions.28  
People may be responsible for the anatomical, physiological, and psychological 
states associated with addiction if they are responsible for becoming addicted, 
 
 26. See HERBERT FINGARETTE & ANN FINGARETTE HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 148 (1979). 
 27. E.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that criminal punishment solely for 
the status of being addicted is cruel and unusual and thus constitutionally impermissible under the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 28. Intentional mental acts do exist, of course.  For example, intentionally adding two and two to 
find the sum is an intentional act.  But a subjective feeling of craving or compulsion is not per se a 
mental act. 
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but the criminal law still would not punish those states because they are solely 
statuses. 
The primary behavioral signs of addiction—seeking and using substances29—
are intentional human actions, even if they are also signs of a disease that has 
genetic, anatomical, and physiological causes.  Indeed, all intentional action has 
genetic, anatomical, and physiological causes, whether or not the action is the 
sign of a disease.30  The addict has an exceptionally powerful desire—a 
craving—to consume the addictive substance, believes that consuming it will 
satisfy that craving by avoiding pain, causing pleasure, or some combination of 
the two, and therefore forms and acts on the intention to seek and to use the 
substance.  Such explanatory practical syllogisms are the mark of all intentional 
actions. 
Intentional action is the primary object of responsibility ascriptions.  
Seeking and using and other associated actions may therefore be morally and 
legally assessed.  To assume that the addict is not responsible for addiction-
related behavior just because it has biological causes or because the action is the 
sign of a disease generally commits the fundamental psycholegal error and 
therefore begs the question of responsibility.  It is natural to think people are 
not responsible for signs and symptoms because mostly they are statuses 
mechanistically caused.  But human action is distinguishable.  It is not simply a 
status. 
Before finally turning to the question of the responsibility of addicts, the 
role that genetics plays in causing the actions associated with addiction first 
must be understood.  The next part undertakes that task. 
VII 
THE GENETIC ROLE IN THE CAUSATION OF ADDICTION-RELATED ACTIONS 
Although environmental variables play an undeniably important role and 
sometimes explain a majority of the variance in the addict’s behavior, the 
variance in agents’ initial responses to a substance and the development of 
craving appear to have a genetic biological substrate.  Virtually all addiction 
experts agree that addiction is a complex, heterogeneous phenotype, that many 
genes contribute only small effects, that the expression of those genes may be 
strongly influenced by the environment, that the heritability of most addictions 
probably does not exceed fifty percent,31  and that the causal mechanisms are not 
 
 29. Jordi Cami & Magi Farré, Mechanisms of Disease: Drug Addiction, 349 N. ENG. J. MED. 975 
(2003); Leshner, supra note 11, at 46 (defining the “essence” of addiction as, “compulsive drug seeking 
and use, even in the face of negative health and social consequences”); Nestler, supra note 3. 
 30. To claim otherwise is to deny the fundamental insight of biological physical naturalism that 
Darwin so profoundly explained. 
 31. Heritability refers to the proportion of the variance of a trait, such as height, cognitive ability, 
or the predisposition to find opiate use pleasurable, that can be attributed to genetic differences within 
some specifically defined population under some specific set of conditions.  It does not refer to how 
much any individual person’s expression of that trait is explained by genetic causes.  Estimates of 
heritability in one defined population, say, males in a specific place, are not transferable to another 
07__MORSE.DOC 9/8/2006  3:52 PM 
Winter/Spring 2006] ADDICTION, GENETICS, AND RESPONSIBILITY 177 
yet well understood.32  Indeed, it is difficult to disentangle preexisting neural 
vulnerabilities from the effects of chronic use.33  Despite the limitations in our 
present understanding, experts believe that there is no single gene or interacting 
set of genes that inevitably or even directly produce intentional seeking and 
using of drugs.34  In general, complex behavioral traits, including those that are 
the expressions of a disease, are rarely explained by a single gene.35 
Addiction may be a disease with a genetic basis, but it is not like 
Huntington’s disease or other single-gene diseases that involve the inevitable 
and purely mechanistic expression of that gene.  The genetic contributions to 
addiction instead affect “intervening” variables that can predispose the person 
to become addicted.  For example, genetic factors may influence the agent’s 
initial response to the substance; brain adaptations, including reward circuitry 
and the degree to which the substance is rewarding; disinhibitory mechanisms; 
physical dependence; and other variables that affect whether an agent who uses 
substances, especially for a prolonged period, compulsively seeks and uses 
because she is motivated by intense craving.36  In short, and colloquially, the 
typically shorter-term “go” mechanisms of the brain are strengthened and the 
 
defined population, say, females in another place.  Also, heritability must be distinguished from 
heritable.  The latter refers to whether the expression of a trait is under some control by genes.  In a 
genetically homogeneous population, a trait might be heritable but have a heritability of zero because 
genes do not explain variation in that population.  In a population in which a trait is genetically 
homogeneous, all variance in that trait in the population would be explained by nongenetic variables.  
TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM F. ZIMMERMAN, BIOLOGY, EVOLUTION AND HUMAN NATURE 
92 (2001). 
 32. E.g., ROBERT PLOMIN, JOHN C. DEFRIES, GERALD E. MCCLEARN, & PETER MCGUFFIN, 
BEHAV. GENETICS 265–72 (4th ed. 2001); John C. Crabbe, Genetic Contributions to Addiction, 53 ANN. 
REV. PSYCHOL. 435, 437, 451–52 (2002); Mary Jeanne Kreek, David A. Nielson & K. Steven LaForge, 
Genes Associated with Addiction: Alcohol, Opiate, and Cocaine Addiction, 5 NEUROMOLECULAR 
MED. 85, 86 (2004); Nestler, supra note 3.  Alcoholism is the most intensely studied addiction.  Future 
research will surely confirm a genetic contribution to addiction and provide increased understanding of 
the causal mechanisms.  See generally Anne M. Glazier, Joseph H. Nadeau & Timothy J. Altman, 
Finding Genes that Underlie Complex Traits, 298 SCIENCE 2345, 2345–46 (2002)(proposing standards 
for proof of discovery of genes for complex traits); Kenneth S. Kendler, Psychiatric Genetics: A 
Methodological Critique, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 3 (2005) (reviewing the four major research 
paradigms and proposing that they be better integrated with recognition of the strengths and 
weaknesses of each). 
 33. Monique Ernst, Alane S. Kimes & Sandra Jazbec, Neuroimaging and Mechanisms of Drug 
Abuse: Interface of Molecular Imaging and Molecular Genetics, 13 NEUROIMAGING CLINICS N. AM. 
833, 839 (2003); see also Véronique Deroche-Gamonet, David Belin & Pier Vicenzo Piazza, Evidence 
for Addiction-like Behavior in the Rat, 305 SCIENCE 1014, 1016–17 (2004) (stating the interaction of 
phenotypical vulnerability and length of exposure explains the onset of addiction). 
 34. William M. Compton, Yonette F. Thomas, Kevin P. Conway & James D. Colliver, 
Developments in the Epidemiology of Drug Use and Drug Use Disorders, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1494, 
1498 (2005) (stating drug use disorders are “genetically and phenotypically complex” and arise from 
“multiple genes exerting small effects,” and inter alia, “gene-by-environment” interactions). 
 35. Crabbe, supra note 32, at 437; EVA JABLONKA & MARION J. LAMB, EVOLUTION IN FOUR 
DIMENSIONS: GENETIC, EPIGENETIC, BEHAVIORAL, AND SYMBOLIC VARIATION IN THE HISTORY OF 
LIFE 6 (2005); see generally Terrie E. Moffitt, Avshalom Caspi & Michael Rutter, Strategy for 
Investigating Interactions Between Measured Genes and Measured Environment, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 473, 474–78 (2005) (describing strategies to test hypotheses about gene-environment 
interactions). 
 36. E.g., Nestler, supra note 3, at 278. 
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typically longer-term “stop” mechanisms are weakened.37  None of these 
explanatory variables denies or is inconsistent, however, with the truth that 
seeking and using drugs and other drug-related behaviors are intentional 
actions. 
It is of course possible that in many cases these addiction-predisposing 
genetic variables might be affected by environmental causes and that genetics 
might play only a trivial role.  It would make no difference to the analysis of 
responsibility, however, that the causes of the predisposition were 
environmental rather than biological.  Both the brain and the mind can be 
changed by both biological and psychological variables, and environmental 
causes may be every bit as powerful as biological causes.  From the purely 
causal perspective, a cause is just a cause.38  For the purpose of analysis, 
however, let us make the simplifying assumption that genetic causes over which 
the agent has no rational control always play a non-trivial role in causing the 
anatomical, physiological, and psychological changes associated with prolonged 
substance use and consequent addiction. 
VIII 
RESPONSIBILITY AND ADDICTION 
An agent will not be held responsible for anatomical, physiological, or 
psychological states associated with addiction, but the addict potentially may be 
held responsible for addiction-associated actions such as possession, use, or 
other crimes motivated by the desire to obtain and use drugs.  Thus, the addict 
must be evaluated as an acting agent, a person who acts for reasons, and not 
simply as a biophysical mechanism.  This would be true even if craving and 
compulsive seeking and using drugs were the inevitable, mechanistic outcome 
of a single-gene defect.  The question, then, is how to assess the responsibility of 
an agent acting intentionally and unlawfully, but apparently compulsively in 
response to cravings. 
The criminal actions of addicts are in fact actions, not mechanisms, even if 
they may also be properly characterized as signs of disease or brain pathology, 
and discovery of biological or psychosocial causes does not per se negate agency 
and create an excusing condition.  All actions have biological and non-
biological causes.  The agent is not an addict unless the person seeks and uses 
the drug.  And when she seeks and uses, she acts.  She is not legally 
unconscious, even according to the most extravagantly narrow definition of 
action, and she surely acts intentionally.  Genetically induced pathology may be 
 
 37. See generally Samuel M. McClure et al., Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed 
Monetary Rewards, 306 SCIENCE 503, 505–06 (2004) (finding that different areas of the brain are 
activated by short-term and long-term rewards; these findings are consistent with the view that our 
“passions” particularly affect short-term reward choices). 
 38. See JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS, HUMAN NATURE AFTER DARWIN: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
INTRODUCTION (2000) (providing a complete analysis of the indistinguishability of biological and 
social causation as threats to personhood and ordinary responsibility). 
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a prime source of a craving, and compulsive action to satisfy the craving may 
produce harmful consequences, but activity to satisfy the craving for drugs is 
nonetheless action.  The core definition of addiction entails this. 
The question, therefore, is whether addicts should be excused for their 
addiction-related actions.  This part begins an answer with consideration of 
those features of addiction-related behavior—craving and compulsion—that are 
most relevant to an assessment of the criminal law’s excusing conditions of lack 
of rationality and legal compulsion.  It continues by addressing the two primary 
theoretical candidates for why actions motivated by cravings and compulsions 
might be excused—the internal compulsion and irrationality theories.  Finally, it 
turns to society’s responsibility for addiction-related behaviors and whether 
such responsibility negates or lessens individual responsibility. 
A. The Meaning of Craving and Compulsion 
This article previously explored the phenomenology of addiction and has 
implicitly accepted a common-sense understanding of craving and compulsion.  
Now let us consider whether more precise clinical and scientific definitions of 
craving and compulsion can be provided. 
The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, 4th Edition Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR)39 does not use the 
term “addiction” and does not make craving and compulsive seeking or using 
necessary criteria of a substance disorder.  Nonetheless, this article will consider 
what this manual and other authoritative sources teach about these crucial 
features of addiction. 
DSM-IV-TR defines the generic “essential feature” of the class of substance 
dependence disorders as, “a cluster of cognitive, behavioral, and physiological 
symptoms indicating that the individual continues use of the substance despite 
significant substance-related problems.  There is a pattern of repeated self-
administration that usually results in tolerance, withdrawal, and compulsive 
drug-taking behavior.”40  DSM-IV-TR does state, however, that “[a]lthough not 
specifically listed as a criterion item, ‘craving’ (a strong subjective drive to use 
the substance) is likely to be experienced by most (if not all) individuals with 
Substance Dependence.”41 
The International Classification of Disorders (ICD-10)42 describes the 
dependence syndrome generically as follows: 
A cluster of physiological, behavioural, and cognitive phenomena in which the use of a 
substance or class of substances takes on a much higher priority for a given individual 
than other behaviours that once had greater value.  A central descriptive characteristic 
 
 39. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 2. 
 40. Id. at 192. 
 41. Id. 
 42. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE ICD-10 CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL AND 
BEHAVIOURAL DISORDERS (1992). 
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of the dependence syndrome is the desire (often strong, sometimes overpowering) to 
take psychoactive drugs . . ., alcohol or tobacco.43 
Two specific but not necessary ICD-10 criteria for dependence are a “strong 
desire or sense of compulsion to take the substance” and “difficulties in 
controlling substance-taking behaviour.”44 
With respect, these definitions of craving and related states are conclusory, 
vague, and unoperationalized.  This problem is not remedied by consulting 
other analogous criteria or definitions.  For example, DSM-IV-TR defines the 
“essential feature” of an Impulse-Control Disorder as, “the failure to resist an 
impulse, drive, or temptation to perform an act that is harmful to the person or 
to others.”45  In its generic introduction to impulse-control disorders, the manual 
continues: “For most of the disorders in this section, the individual feels an 
increasing sense of tension or arousal before committing the act and then 
experiences pleasure, gratification, or relief at the time of committing the act.”46  
Again, this definition may be related in a loose way to what one might mean by 
craving or compulsion, but it is surely over inclusive as a precise definition of 
these terms. 
Finally, DSM-IV-TR’s formal use of the diagnostic term, “compulsion,” 
which is defined as part of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, an anxiety disorder, 
bears little relation to compulsive drug seeking and using.  Compulsions are 
defined generically as: 
repetitive behaviors (e.g., hand washing, ordering, checking) or mental acts (e.g., 
praying, counting, repeating words silently) the goal of which is to prevent or reduce 
anxiety or distress, not to provide pleasure or gratification.  In most cases, the person 
feels driven to perform the compulsion to reduce the distress that accompanies an 
obsession or to prevent some dreaded event or situation . . . .  By definition, 
compulsions are either clearly excessive or are not connected in a realistic way with 
what they are designed to neutralize or prevent.47 
Addictive drug seeking and using is excessive, but it is surely realistically 
designed to prevent anxiety and distress among addicts for whom this is the 
primary motivation to take drugs.  In either case, the compulsions of the person 
with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder are distinguishable from the compulsions 
experienced by an addict. 
Neither “compulsion,” “compulsive,” nor “craving” is among the terms 
included in DSM-IV-TR’s “Glossary of Technical Terms.”48  On the other hand, 
the most recent edition of the American Psychiatric Glossary does define 
“compulsive” as follows: “Refers to intensity or repetitiveness of behavior 
 
 43. Id. at 75. 
 44. Id.  According to ICD-10, it is thus possible to be diagnosed as dependent in the absence of any 
analogue to “compulsive” behavior. 
 45. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 2, at 663.  This feature refers to “impulse control 
disorders not elsewhere classified,” but DSM-IV-TR makes clear that other disorders, such as 
substance-related disorders, “may have features that involve problems of impulse control.”  Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 457; see also id. at 462 (listing the specific criteria). 
 48. Id. at 764–65. 
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rather than to compulsive behavior strictly defined.  Thus, ‘compulsive 
drinking’ and ‘compulsive gambling’ refer to cravings that may be intense and 
often repeated, but they are not viewed as compulsions.”49  Craving is not 
defined, but this definition of “compulsive” does seem akin to the generic 
definition of addiction under consideration. 
However it is defined, the crucial criterial term, “compulsive,” is 
frustratingly vague and dependent primarily on assessment of subjective states.  
For example, DSM-IV-TR’s criterion for Impulse-Control Disorder—the 
failure to resist a drive, impulse, or temptation to engage in harmful activity—
does not disclose whether the person is unable or unwilling to resist or how 
hard it is to resist, nor does it indicate how harmful the act must be.50  Further, 
the definition of Impulse-Control Disorder does not reveal how much inner 
tension and how much release-seeking behavior is necessary to qualify for the 
diagnosis of an impulse-control problem.  ICD-10’s criterion of an “often 
strong, sometimes overpowering” drive again does not specify how strong is 
strong enough and what is meant by overpowering.  In the case of either of 
these criteria, if simply taking the drug repetitively (or, seemingly, taking it even 
once if it leads to a predictably harmful outcome) is sufficient, then the 
definition is essentially circular. 
Such definitions will depend ultimately on a subjective assessment of the 
strength of desires and a normative assessment of when the seeking and using 
itself is sufficiently harmful to the agent to appear like a symptom, rather than 
like a bad or even harmless habit or a hobby.  And how bad it will be for the 
agent will in turn depend a great deal on environmental variables that are 
entirely independent of brain states, such as the cost, availability, and legality of 
the substance.51 
The definitional problems apparently can be remedied in various ways.  
First, compulsion (or addiction) could be defined operationally in terms of 
scores on various scales.  There are many virtues to such an approach and it 
should be applauded.  Even if various scales are reliable, however, validity 
problems will remain because there is no diagnostic gold standard.  Moreover, 
there is no consensual agreement on the scales.  Second, compulsion can be 
defined in terms of objective behavior—without regard to subjective 
experience—or in economic or rational choice terms, definitions that have 
theoretical, measurement, and esthetic advantages.52  Indeed, there is clear 
 
 49. AM. PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY 45 (Narriman C. Shahrokh & Robert J. E. Hales eds., 8th ed. 
2003) (emphasis added). 
 50. Attempts to measure the strength of compulsions have been conceptually confused or 
methodologically suspect.  See Stephen J. Morse, From ‘Sikora’ to ‘Hendricks’: Mental Disorder and 
Criminal Responsibility, in THE EVOLUTION OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW 129, 160–63 (Lynda E. Frost & 
Richard J. Bonnie eds., 2001). 
 51. See JON ELSTER, STRONG FEELINGS: EMOTION, ADDITION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 166–69 
(1999); Alan Schwartz, Views of Addiction and the Duty to Warn, 75 VA. L. REV. 509, 517–23 (rejecting 
the “strong substance caused view” of addiction). 
 52. See generally GEORGE AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL (2001) [hereinafter BREAKDOWN OF 
WILL]; GEORGE AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS: THE STRATEGIC INTERACTION OF SUCCESSIVE 
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evidence that classical and operant conditioning best explain some addictive 
phenomena, and some researchers believe that any definition including 
subjective experiences such as craving will be circular.  Nevertheless, a purely 
objective definition will fail to consider the addict’s subjectivity, which most 
investigators and informed observers believe is crucial to adequate 
understanding.53  If craving is crucial to the definition, including it does not 
threaten circularity because craving can exist in the absence of seeking and 
using behavior.  Finally, addiction could be defined in terms of tolerance and 
withdrawal because these physiologically related states might be relatively 
objectively measured.  Indeed, these criteria are included in both DSM-IV-TR 
and ICD-10, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient.  Compulsive drug 
seeking and using can exist without them, and they can exist without 
accompanying compulsive activity and consequent harms. 
In sum, present authoritative sources tell us, mostly conclusorily, that agents 
are driven, that they feel strong or overpowering desires, that they have intense 
cravings, and, least helpfully, that they are compelled.  We are left where we 
began—with a descriptive phenomenological account of the addict’s subjective 
mental states and behavior and common-sense understanding of those mental 
states and behavior. 
Although the present understanding of craving and compulsion is often 
vague and inferential, the terms do have common-sense content and they are 
clearly both continuum concepts.  Not all agents who experience craving and 
compulsion experience these states with the same intensity.  If craving and 
compulsion may be predicates of an excuse for addiction-related action, it 
seems to follow that the intensity of these states would be crucial to 
responsibility assessment.  But we do not have scientifically validated measures 
for the intensity of craving and compulsion, and even the discovery of clear 
biological (or other) causes for these states may not help in this regard.  Craving 
and compulsion are intentional mental states.  They take objects; people crave a 
specific thing or feel compelled to do a specific thing.  A crucial feature about 
such states is that agents have privileged first-person access to them.  Unless 
mental states are identical to and reducible to physical states—a highly 
controversial position in the philosophy of mind54—identification of biological 
causes will not indicate the subjective intensity of craving and compulsion.  The 
upshot is that analysis of the responsibility of addicts for addiction-related 
behavior—however the addiction is caused—must at present rely on concepts 
 
MOTIVATIONAL STATES WITHIN THE PERSON 96–273 (1992).  But see Gideon Yaffe, Recent Work on 
Addiction and Responsible Agency, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 178 (2001) (criticizing the usefulness of 
rational choice and related models of addiction for thinking about individual responsibility). 
 53. See ELSTER, supra note 51, at 62–65. 
 54. See generally PAUL M. CHURCHLAND, MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 7–49 (rev. ed. 1988) 
(reviewing various approaches to understanding the mind-body problem).  It is not known how the 
brain produces the mind.  Until the mind-body problem is “solved,” which will revolutionize our 
understanding of biology, such questions will remain.  PAUL R. MCHUGH & PHILIP R. SLAVNEY, THE 
PERSPECTIVES OF PSYCHIATRY 11–12 (2d ed. 1998). 
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about the mental states of intentional agents that can be best evaluated using 
common sense. 
B. Addiction and Individual Responsibility55 
Once addicted, should addicts be responsible for use and further drug-
related activity?  By definition, addicts—or anyway most of them—experience 
subjective craving and compulsion to seek and use drugs.  In some cases, 
withdrawal also might be feared, but most addicts know that the physical 
symptoms are manageable, and some of the “hardest” drugs addicts experience 
no physical withdrawal or any withdrawal syndrome at all.56  Craving and 
compulsion drive the addict.  If compulsion and lack of the capacity for 
rationality are the law’s primary excusing conditions,57 do craving and 
compulsion to use addictive substances or to engage in other addiction-related 
crimes provide a compulsion or rationality excuse? 
1. The Internal Coercion Theory58 
Although the biological models and the discovery of biological causes imply 
that the addict’s symptomatic behaviors are mechanisms, this is simply not true.  
Compulsive states are marked by allegedly overwhelming desires or cravings, 
but whether the cravings are produced by faulty biology, including genetic 
predispositions or defects, faulty psychology, faulty environment, or some 
combination of the three, a desire is just a desire and its satisfaction by seeking 
and using is human action.  The addict desires, broadly, either the pleasure of 
intoxication, the avoidance of the pain of withdrawal or inner tension, or both.  
 
 55. Much of the analysis in this part necessarily involves philosophical, abstract concepts.  The 
issue of responsibility is conceptual, moral, social, and political; it is not scientific, although scientifically 
discovered data and theories can provide important inputs to moral, social, and legal thinking.  See 
generally Comm. on Addictions, supra note 21; Yaffe, supra note 52 (reviewing and analyzing empirical 
and philosophical concepts).  Two recent, edited collections concerning genetics and criminality are 
excellent sources concerning genetics and responsibility, although neither is specifically focused on 
addiction.  See Dan W. Brock & Allen E. Buchanan, The Genetics of Behavior and Concepts of Free 
Will and Determinism, in GENETICS AND CRIMINALITY: THE POTENTIAL MISUSE OF SCIENTIFIC 
INFORMATION IN COURT 67 (Jeffrey R. Botkin, William M. McMahon & Leslie Pickering Francis eds., 
1999) (see especially); GENETICS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR (David Wasserman & Robert Wachbroit 
eds., 2001).  See supra Part II for highly sophisticated contributions concerning responsibility. 
 56. Withdrawal from cocaine, for example, produces dysphoric mood rather than the 
uncomfortable physical symptoms that accompany opiate withdrawal.  Margaret Haney, Neurobiology 
of Stimulants, in THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PUBLISHING TEXTBOOK OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
TREATMENT 31, 36–37 (Marc Glanter & Herbert D. Kleber eds., 3d ed. 2004).  Some “hard” drugs, 
such as PCP, have no withdrawal syndrome.  Shelly F. Greenfield & Grace Hennessy, Assessment of the 
Patient, in id. at 101, 112. 
 57. There is no uncontroversially correct descriptive model of the law’s responsibility doctrines and 
practices.  Some model must implicitly or explicitly be used to assess responsibility, however.  I have 
argued that the model being used is the best overall description of our law and is normatively desirable.  
See infra Part IV; see also Morse, supra note 16; Morse, supra note 24.  The general model may not 
convince everyone concerning all details, but it is clearly a standard type of view and not idiosyncratic. 
 58. See generally Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV. 
1025, 1054–63 (2002) (explaining the meaning of internal compulsions generally). 
07__MORSE.DOC 9/8/2006  3:52 PM 
184 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 69:165 
The addict believes that using the substance will satisfy the desire and 
consequently forms the intention to seek and to use the substance. 
To attempt to demonstrate that people suffering from compulsive states are 
similar to mechanisms, the following type of analogy is often used.  Imagine that 
a person is hanging by the fingernails from a cliff over a very deep chasm.  The 
hapless cliffhanger is strong enough to hold on for a while, but not strong 
enough to save her life by pulling herself up.  As time passes and gravity and 
muscle physiology do their work, she inevitably weakens and it becomes harder 
and harder to hang on.  Finally it becomes impossible and the cliffhanger falls to 
her death.  We are asked to believe that the operation of compulsive desires or 
cravings is like the combined effect of gravity and muscle physiology.  At first 
the hapless addict can perhaps resist, but inevitably she weakens and satisfies 
the desire for drugs. 
Brief reflection demonstrates that the analogy is flawed as an explanation of 
why compulsive states are “just like” mechanisms.  Unlike action to satisfy a 
desire, the fall is a genuine mechanism.  Holding on indefinitely is physically 
impossible and the ultimate failure of strength is not intentional.  Imagine the 
following counterexample: A vicious gunslinger trails the addict closely and 
threatens to kill her instantly if she seeks or uses drugs.  Assuming that the 
addict wants to live as much as the cliffhanger does, no addict would yield to the 
desire.59  Conversely, even if the same gunslinger threatened to shoot the 
cliffhanger immediately if she started to fall, she will fall every time.  Of course, 
our liberal society does not force or even permit addicts to employ such a self-
management technique, but the counterexample, like Leroy Powell’s case,60  
indicates that the addict’s behavior is not a mechanism. 
An addict is not a cliffhanger, of course, so let us consider some closer 
analogies, such as a powerful, persistent itch, or an increasingly full bladder, or 
the motor and verbal tics of those suffering from Tourette’s Disorder.61  It can 
be damnably hard not to scratch an itch, even if it is contraindicated.  An 
increasingly full bladder can cause dreadful discomfort and an overwhelming 
feeling of the need to void.  The premonitory build up of tension that precedes 
 
 59. Addicts simply need sufficiently good reason not to yield.  One might object that they only 
need sufficiently good inducement, rather than good reason, but in this case the inducement is in fact a 
good reason.  Another possibility is that the variable motivating abstinence is not a good reason, but 
simply one that is so salient that it creates motivational force.  This is undoubtedly possible, but in most 
cases of genuine addiction, what induces abstinence will almost certainly be a good reason, rather than 
simply a salient rationale.  Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Professor of Philosophy, University of North 
Carolina, provided helpful insight on these points. 
 60. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 517–18 (1968) (suggesting that Powell was able to stop 
drinking the day of his trial for public drunkenness because he knew that he had to be in court). 
 61. The itch example was given by George Ainslie, Chief of Psychiatry at the Coatesville, 
Pennsylvania Veterans Administration Hospital.  Dr. Ainslie is a leading theorist and researcher on 
addictions.  See generally AINSLIE, supra note 51.  The bladder example was first suggested by an 
anonymous participant at a conference.  Jon Elster also uses it.  On Tourette’s Disorder, see Charles W. 
Popper, G. Davis Gammon, Scott A. West & Charles E. Bailey, Disorders Usually First Diagnosed in 
Infancy, Childhood, or Adolescence, in TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, 833, 906–11 (Robert E. 
Hales & Stuart C. Yudofsky eds., 4th ed. 2003). 
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and is relieved by tic behavior among those suffering from Tourette’s is usually 
intense and far more bothersome than the tics themselves.  In all cases, the 
“pressure” to satisfy the desire, to end the discomfort, can be immense.  But 
even in such cases the agent will be to some degree reward-sensitive or reason-
responsive.  The gun at the head will work again.  If people with itches, full 
bladders, or pre-tic tension satisfy the desire to rid themselves of the itch, 
discomfort, or tension, surely their behavior will be action and not mechanism.62 
Still, although the addict’s behavior is not mechanism, perhaps not seeking 
and using is as hard as not scratching an itch, voiding one’s bladder, or engaging 
in tic behavior.  Is it fair to expect the addict to self-regulate successfully in 
ordinary circumstances that do not permit brute techniques, such as threatening 
oneself with instant death, just in case one lapses?  Is yielding to the desire an 
appropriate basis for blame and punishment, especially in extreme cases?  
Perhaps, after all, drug-related activity is sufficiently like mechanistic movement 
to qualify for an excuse, but this requires an argument rather than an analogy.  
Too often we are seduced by medical metaphors that strongly suggest 
mechanism.  Nevertheless, the disease model and ordinary language—the 
addict allegedly “can’t help using,” or is “impelled to use,” or, more bluntly, is 
“compelled to use”—suggest that addiction primarily produces a control or 
volitional problem. 
Volition is a vexing foundational problem for philosophy, psychology, and 
law.63  Even if “black box” models of control problems seem to explain the 
phenomena deemed addiction, the law’s concept of the person as a conscious, 
intentional agent implies that such models cannot provide the law with 
adequate guidance either to decide if an excuse is warranted either in general or 
in individual cases.  Any model must translate into terms of human agency. 
Consider some alternatives.  If one adopts Professor Michael Moore’s 
influential, widely-noticed contention that volition is a functional mental state 
of executory intention,64 the problem of volition disappears because virtually no 
addict has a volitional problem.  Their wills translate their desires for the drug 
into the necessary action quite effectively.  Indeed, on this account of the will, 
almost no intentional conduct will raise a problem of volition.65  Moore’s 
account is persuasive, but like all accounts of the philosophical foundations of 
action, it is controversial.  Some competitors that consider volition a species of 
desire, a view that Moore and others reject,66 may raise volitional problems in 
 
 62. If a full bladder finally simply “overflows” because the pressure prevents the agent from 
controlling the sphincter muscles, voiding is purely a mechanism. 
 63. See Bernard J. Baars, Why Volition is a Foundation Problem for Psychology, 2 
CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 281 (1993); Morse, Culpability and Control, supra note 25, at 1595–97. 
 64. MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
FOR CRIMINAL LAW 113–65 (1993). 
 65. Id. 
 66. E.g., GALEN STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND BELIEF 66–67 (1986) (citing Kant). 
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the case of addicts.67  Unless these alternatives can be reduced to ordinary 
language concepts that apply to human agency, however, it will be impossible 
for legislatures and courts to resolve disputes about the metaphysics of mind 
and action rationally.68 
An “internal coercion” model is one possible explanation of a control or 
volitional excuse based on “disorders of desire.”69  The model employs a 
moralized, common-sense approach that is analogous to the criminal law excuse 
of duress and that requires no implausible, unverifiable empirical assumptions 
about how the mind works.70  Thinking about duress is fundamental to this 
approach.  Consequently, its criteria will be considered before turning to 
whether the model can be applied to addictions. 
Duress obtains if the defendant is threatened with the use of deadly force or 
grievous bodily harm against himself or another unless the defendant commits 
an equally or more serious crime, and a person of reasonable firmness would 
have been “unable to resist” the threat.71  In other words, an agent faced with a 
particularly “hard choice”—commit a crime or be killed or grievously injured—
is legally excused if the choice is too hard to expect the agent to buck up and 
obey the law.  The defense, however, is not based on empirical assumptions 
about the subjective capacity of an individual agent to resist threats; it is 
moralized and made objective.72  For example, the defense is not available to a 
defendant allegedly “unable” to resist if the threats were less than death or 
grievous bodily harm or if a person of reasonable firmness would have been 
able to resist. 
The moralized criterion of the person of reasonable firmness necessary to 
support the excuse of duress appears to risk unfairness.  Suppose a person 
would find it extraordinarily difficult to resist threats that a person of 
 
 67. See, e.g., WILLIAM CHARLTON, WEAKNESS OF THE WILL: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 
(1988) (discussing competing accounts of weakness of the will); R. Jay Wallace, Addiction as Defect of 
the Will: Some Philosophical Reflections, 18 L. & PHIL. 621 (1999) (see especially Section 2). 
 68. A classic, well-known example of a theory of volition that can be understood in ordinary 
language terms and that has therefore received much attention in the legal as well as philosophical 
literature is Harry Frankfurt’s hierarchical theory.  HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE IMPORTANCE OF 
WHAT WE CARE ABOUT: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 11, 24 (1988).  For reasons considered elsewhere, 
however, this seemingly attractive model does not succeed.  See Morse, Culpability and Control, supra 
note 25, at 1626–28. 
 69. The next subsection suggests that irrationality provides a better explanation of why we might 
excuse or mitigate the responsibility of an agent suffering from a disorder of desire such as addiction. 
 70. The analysis in this subsection has been enormously influenced by Alan Wertheimer’s 
treatment of similar issues.  See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987).  It is assumed that duress can 
sometimes be an excusing condition.  See Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the 
Excuse and Searching for its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331 (1989).  R. Jay Wallace believes 
that it is always a justification.  See WALLACE, supra note 6, at 144–47.  The differences are discussed in 
the text infra. 
 71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1962). 
 72. Using the term “objective” is not meant to suggest that the “person of reasonable firmness” 
criterion has a reality independent of our practices that can be discovered by reason or empirical 
investigation.  It is only meant to be a thoroughly normative standard that expresses what we all expect 
of each other in our legal and moral culture. 
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reasonable firmness could resist.  Under such conditions, criminal penalties 
would be retributively unjust because a person does not deserve punishment for 
conduct that is so difficult for that agent to avoid.  Moreover, specific 
deterrence is bootless in such cases.  A purely consequential view might justify 
punishment to buck up the marginal people, but only at the cost of injustice to 
those unable to resist.  Because fault is a necessary condition for blame and 
punishment in our system, denying the defense would be unjust.  Those who 
take this position should argue for a purely subjective view of the duress excuse, 
which would require difficult empirical assessment of the defendant’s capacity 
to resist.  This standard would be a nightmare to adjudicate, but worth the 
effort if it were necessary to avoid injustice. 
There is a good argument, however, that the moralized, objective standard 
that uses the person of reasonable firmness as the criterion is not unfair.  If a 
person is threatened with death, for example, the defense of duress should be 
potentially available unless the balance of evils is so remarkably negative that 
every person would be expected to resist.  In all other cases, the question would 
at least “go to the jury.”  Thus, there will be few cases involving sufficiently 
serious threats in which the person incapable of resisting would lose the 
potential defense.  The person genuinely incapable—if any there be—of 
resisting even when the threats are relatively mild—say, kill or be touched—will 
almost certainly be a person with irrational fears that will qualify for some type 
of irrationality defense.  Duress might not obtain, but exculpation will be 
available on other grounds. 
The formulation, “unable to resist,” has the unmistakable implication of 
mechanism.  Unless force majeure or genuine mechanism is at work, we 
virtually never know whether the agent is in some sense genuinely unable or is 
simply unwilling to resist, and if the latter, how hard it is for the agent to resist.  
In the present state of knowledge, research evidence concerning the 
characteristics that help people maintain control when faced with temptation or 
experiencing impulses is no more than a general guide.73  No metric and no 
instrumentation can accurately resolve questions about the strength of craving 
and the ability to resist.  This was in large part the reason that both the 
American Psychiatric Association and the American Bar Association 
recommended the abolition of the control or volitional test for legal insanity in 
the wake of the ferment following the Hinckley74 verdict.75  Moreover, courts 
 
 73. ROY F. BAUMEISTER, TODD F. HEATHERTON & DIANNE M. TICE, LOSING CONTROL: HOW 
AND WHY PEOPLE FAIL AT SELF-REGULATION 242–56 (1994) (considering self-regulation techniques 
and distinguishing underregulation, in which the agent often actively participates, and misregulation, in 
which the agent seldom actively participates).  See generally BREAKDOWN OF WILL, supra note 52 
(applying hyperbolic discounting theories to problems of willpower and loss of control); ALBERT 
BANDURA, SELF-EFFICACY: THE EXERCISE OF CONTROL (1997) (providing an overview of human 
agency and presentation of “self-efficacy” theory); HOWARD RACHLIN, THE SCIENCE OF SELF-
CONTROL (2000) (providing a review of research and theoretical account of self-control based on 
“teleological behaviorism”). 
 74. United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.C. 1981). 
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faced with deciding whether to adopt a volitional test after Hinkley refused to 
do so for the same reason.76  If strength of craving or of resistance are to be the 
touchstones, legal decisionmakers will have to act with little scientific guidance 
and lots of common sense.77 
The analogy often used to demonstrate that craving is like duress is that the 
intense cravings or desires of “compulsive” states are like an “internal” gun to 
the head.  The sufferer’s fear of physical or psychological withdrawal symptoms 
and of other dysphoric states78 is allegedly so great that it is analogous to the 
“do-it-or-else” fear of death or grievous bodily injury that is necessary for a 
duress defense.  Yielding to a compulsive desire, a craving, is therefore like 
yielding to a threat of death or grievous bodily harm.79  The argument is that we 
cannot expect a person of reasonable firmness not to yield in the face of such an 
internally generated hard choice, much as we cannot expect such a person not 
to yield in the face of an external threat of death or grievous bodily harm. 
The analogy is attractive, but theoretically and practically problematic.  
First, the analogy suggests no problem with the defender’s will, which operates 
effectively to execute the intention to block or to remove the dysphoria.80  
Further, it is entirely rational, at least in the short-term, to wish to terminate 
ghastly dysphoria, even if there are competing reasons not to, such as criminal 
sanctions or moral degradation.  And it is simply not the case that addicts 
always act to satisfy their cravings because they fear dysphoria.  Many just yield 
because it is unpleasant to abstain, not because they substantially fear 
dysphoria.  In addition, the phenomenology of the sufferer’s response to 
craving, unlike the phenomenology of the victim threatened by death, often is 
not, and perhaps never is, clear or the product of unitary, simple causes.  
Suppose, for example, that the primary motive is the pleasure or satisfaction of 
yielding or that such pleasure is an important, additional motive.  The 
 
 75. See AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 330, 339–42 (1989); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, INSANITY DEFENSE: 
POSITION STATEMENT (1982). 
 76. E.g., United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).  The Court also held that 
narcotics addiction alone, without other physiological or psychological involvement, was not a mental 
disease or defect for the purpose of raising the insanity defense.  Id.  Presumably, the court meant 
physiological or psychological effects that were not per se part of the criteria for addiction.  Congress 
later abolished the volitional wing of the insanity defense in federal criminal trials and retained only a 
cognitive test for legal insanity.  Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2000). 
 77. For example, one writer explains, “The strength of the craving may be gauged by how willing 
the person is to sacrifice other sources of reward or well-being in life to continue engaging in the 
addictive behavior.”  Dennis M. Donovan, Assessment of Addictive Behaviors: Implications of an 
Emerging Biopsychosocial Model, in ASSESSMENT OF ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 3, 6 (Dennis M. 
Donovan & G. Alan Marlatt eds., 1988)[hereinafter Donovan, Assessment of Addictive Behaviors].  
Although written by an estimable researcher, it is no more than an operationalized, common-sense 
measure. 
 78. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 2, at 663 (stating that most “impulse-control 
disorders” include an increase of tension and arousal before committing the harmful act). 
 79. In most cases of “impulse-control disorders,” there is an experience of pleasure, satisfaction, or 
relief after committing the impulsive act.  Id. 
 80. FINGARETTE & HASSE, supra note 26, at 61. 
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trace amounts, will “drink through” the miserable sickness.83  These examples 
and common sense suggest that fear of or aversiveness to psychologically 
dysphoric states may be very strong, indeed.84  But is it as strong as the fear of 
death? 
Even assuming that the feared dysphoria of unconsummated cravings can be 
substantial, it will likely seldom be as severe as the fear of death or grievous 
bodily harm.  If this is right and assuming, too, that we could reliably assess the 
fear of dysphoria, few addicts would succeed with a hard-choice excuse.  On the 
other hand, if the drug-related activities were simple possession for personal use 
and use itself, then perhaps the justification of necessity should obtain.85  Even if 
the harm of such activity is less than the harm of dysphoria, however, the law 
would hold most addicts responsible for becoming addicted and thus for placing 
themselves in the situation that created the need for the defense.  The law 
disallows the justification in such cases.86  Finally, even if addicts were not 
responsible for becoming addicted, all legislatures would today resist permitting 
a justification for possession and use on policy grounds and would surely reject 
an excuse for other, possibly related crimes, such as theft or robbery, to pay for 
drugs.  The disease model is powerful, but the moral failure model is resilient. 
In sum, the internal coercion or duress approach uses understandable terms 
and has a moral basis derived from a defense that the criminal law and ordinary 
morality already accept.  Nevertheless, currently insurmountable practical 
problems beset attempting to assess the appropriateness of an excuse in 
individual cases.  What is more, thinking about excuse in terms of control 
difficulties inevitably will invite misleading metaphorical thinking about 
mechanism and expert testimony that is little more than moral judgment 
wrapped in the white coat of allegedly scientific or clinical understanding.  The 
law should not adopt an internal coercion excuse. 
2. The Irrationality Theory 
Irrationality is the most straightforward, persuasive explanation of why 
some addicts should perhaps be excused.  Moreover, irrationality will excuse 
any addict who may apparently qualify under the internal coercion theory.  If 
the craving sufficiently interferes with the addict’s ability to grasp and be guided 
by reason, then a classic irrationality problem arises and there is no need to 
resort to compulsion as the ground for excuse.  Finally, it is simply more 
 
 83. ARNOLD M. LUDWIG, UNDERSTANDING THE ALCOHOLIC’S MIND: THE NATURE OF 
CRAVING AND HOW TO CONTROL IT 58–59 (1988).  Such cases are surely rare, however, and most 
alcoholics who wish to drink either discontinue their aversive therapy or find ways to disable its effect.  
Interestingly, some East Asian populations have a genetically caused variation in the enzymes that 
metabolize alcohol that create effects of ingestion similar to the effects of the aversive therapy 
medication.  Alcohol addiction is consequently infrequent in such populations.  Nestler, supra note 3, at 
277. 
 84. See Donovan, Assessment of Addictive Behaviors, supra note 77. 
 85. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1962). 
 86. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 2003) (allowing the defense as an emergency 
measure to avoid an imminent harm if the situation occurred “through no fault of the actor”). 
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practicable to assess rationality than to assess the strength of compulsive 
desires. 
How does it feel to crave intensely?  The subjective experience of addicts is 
diverse, but a modal tale may be useful.  Despite different historical pathways 
to addiction, descriptions of the subjective experience are broadly of a piece,87 
although different descriptors and metaphors are and could be used.  The story 
is not meant to include all the features of the addictive process; rather, it is an 
approximation of the subjective experience preceding use that may bear on 
responsibility. 
Between episodes of use of the substance, the addict commonly experiences 
a build up of tension, irritation, anxiety, boredom, depression, or other 
dysphoric states.  As time passes since the last use, these dysphoric states 
typically become stronger, more persistent, more intense, and more demanding.  
In some cases, the build-up is described as sheer desire, sheer wanting.  As the 
wanting remains unsatisfied, increased dysphoric states or, in some cases, 
excitement, accompany the wanting.  For illicit-drug addicts, anxiety or fear 
about obtaining the substance often adds to the dysphoria. 
At some point, the addict metaphorically, and in some cases literally, can 
think of nothing but the desire to use the substance.  One informant described 
the desire like “a buzzing in my ears that prevents me from focusing.”  It is like 
an extreme version of being dehydrated or starved: the addict can ordinarily 
think of nothing except getting and using the stuff.  It is like the moment just 
before orgasm during an episode of exceptional excitement, but usually without 
the pleasurable feeling of sexual excitement.  There is only one tune or story in 
the addict’s head and nothing else drives it out.88  When the addict can not get 
the tune out of his head, it is very difficult to concentrate the mind on the good 
reasons not to use, especially because, in almost all instances, there is no police 
officer at the elbow or other available “self-management technique” sufficiently 
powerful to motivate the addict to think clearly about drug-related activity.  
Fundamental components of rationality—the capacities to think clearly and 
self-consciously to evaluate one’s conduct—are compromised.  The agent may 
not recognize the various options at all or may not be able coherently to weigh 
and assess those that are recognized.  For moral and legal purposes, however, 
the precise mechanisms by which addiction can compromise rationality are less 
important than the clear evidence that it can do so.89  On the other hand, the 
 
 87. See, e.g., Donovan, Assessment of Addictive Behaviors, supra note 77, at 5–11 (describing 
“commonalities across addictive behaviors”). 
 88. See, e.g., Michael B. Ross, It’s Time for Me to Die: An Inside Look at Death Row, 26 J. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 475, 482–83 (1998) (providing a first person account given by a death row inmate 
with persistent, allegedly overwhelming urges to degrade, rape, and kill, who describes the urges as a 
song one cannot get out of one’s head).  This example does not involve addictions, of course, but 
certain disorders of sexual desire, the paraphilias, produce impulse control problems similar to those 
associated with substance-related problems and impulse control disorders generally.  AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., supra note 2, at 663. 
 89. See ELSTER, supra note 51, at 169–79 (reviewing the potential mechanisms through which 
cravings resulting from drug addiction can affect rational choice); Peter W. Kalivas, Choose to Study 
07__MORSE.DOC 9/8/2006  3:52 PM 
192 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 69:165 
addict’s characteristic ambivalence about addiction suggests that addicts 
recognize that they have good reason to stop, at least during lucid or inter-use 
intervals.90 
The degree to which the general capacity for rationality is compromised can 
vary widely among addicts.  The modal tale is told as an extreme case and is 
anyway only an approximation.  Still, addiction can compromise rationality and 
therefore can potentially excuse drug-related activity, especially for those most 
severely affected.  Thus, the question remains whether the law should consider 
addiction as a potential excuse.  This is an important question for social and 
legal policy because drugs are a factor in much criminal conduct.  Possession 
and use offenses are rampant, and in most big cities, well over half of all people 
arrested for felonies test positive for addictive substances.91  Many of these are 
surely addicts.  Society may believe that it is fair to blame and punish them, but 
is it? 
Thus far, the assumption has been made that addicts are not responsible for 
becoming addicted.  At this point, this assumption will be relaxed and it will be 
assumed instead that many were responsible because prior to addiction they 
retained general normative capacity and because they knowingly, albeit with 
imperfect information, placed themselves at risk for becoming addicted.  
Moreover, some people may become addicted intentionally.  Of course, because 
the majority of users of any substance do not become addicts, when future 
addicts use substances prior to addiction, virtually none is certain to become 
addicted.  At most, they are consciously aware of the risk,92 especially if they are 
aware of being in a high-risk group, but conscious awareness of substantial risk 
is sufficient to support ascriptions of responsibility.  At the very least, an addict 
becomes addicted negligently.  Some addicts are not at all responsible for their 
condition because they genuinely became addicted before late adolescence, 
 
Choice in Addiction, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 193 (2004) (stating that at some point in a developing 
addiction disorder, decisionmaking ability becomes compromised); Louk J.M.J. Vanderschuren & 
Barry J. Everitt, Drug Seeking Becomes Compulsive After Prolonged Cocaine Self-Administration, 305 
SCIENCE 1017, 1017 (2004) (“Addicts display drug-dominated, inflexible behavior and are unable to 
shift their thoughts and behavior away from drugs and drug-related activities,” which increases with 
prolonged use). 
 90. This point is courtesy of George Ainslie, Chief of Psychiatry at the Coatesville, Pennsylvania 
Veterans Administration Hospital. 
 91. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 
2002, 10, 11 (2003) (finding that 20.4% of sentenced state inmates in 2001 incarcerated for drug 
offenses; 55% of sentenced federal inmates incarcerated for drug offenses); ZHANG, supra note 2; see 
also DORIS JAMES WILSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DRUG USE, TESTING, AND 
TREATMENT IN JAILS 1 (2000) (finding that in 1998, 70% of jail inmates had used drugs regularly or 
had committed a drug offense). 
 92. This language tracks the Model Penal Code’s definition of recklessness, which is defined as 
conscious awareness that one’s conduct is producing a substantial and unjustifiable risk of some harm.  
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962).  In the case of licit substances, such as alcohol and nicotine, 
the risk may not be legally unjustified, however, because using and being addicted to these substances 
are not unlawful. 
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because they were involuntarily addicted, or for some other responsibility-
diminishing reason.  Such addicts are a minority, however.93 
Whether or not addicts were responsible for becoming addicted, they will 
not lack mens rea for their substance-related criminal activity.94  Virtually all 
potential addicts are consciously aware of the risk that if addicted they will 
persistently and intentionally seek and use substances.  Nevertheless, the 
previous conscious awareness of this risk is distinguishable from forming the 
intention pre-addiction to seek and use after becoming addicted.  For most 
addicts, however, there will be no mens rea problem when they seek and use.  
They are not automatons and they do form the intent to buy, possess, and use.  
In most cases of serious criminal wrongdoing, the potential addict may be 
unaware of the risk of committing such offenses unless the addict has a history 
of such wrongdoing.  Even if this is true, however, there still will be no mens rea 
problem.  An addict who burgles, robs, or kills surely forms the intent to do so.  
In the narrow legal sense, most addicts have the true purpose to engage in their 
drug-related conduct.  If they deserve mitigation and excuse, it is because they 
are not fully rational, not because they lack the mental state required by the 
definition of the offense. 
As a result of addiction, some addicts are sufficiently irrational to warrant 
mitigation or excuse at the time they commit their substance-related crimes.  
Should they be held responsible nonetheless?  Two theories suggest in general 
that virtually all should be.  The first is that by experimenting, the addict 
knowingly took the risk that she would become irrational, including the 
possibility that the irrationality would operate specifically in contexts involving 
substance-related behavior.  The second and more convincing theory is that 
almost all addicts have lucid, rational intervals between episodes of use during 
which they could act on the good reasons to seek help quitting or otherwise to 
take steps to avoid engaging in harmful drug-related behavior.  This situation 
has been termed a case of potential diachronic self-control because the person 
knows that at a later time she will be in a state of non-responsible irrationality.95  
Again, the ambivalence about addiction that characterizes addicts implies that 
they are capable of and do recognize these good reasons during their lucid 
intervals.  Even if some addicts are unable to think rationally when they are in a 
 
 93. Assuming that addicts are responsible for their condition, an interesting question is whether 
addiction is just a status, as Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), held, or whether it necessarily 
includes seeking and using behavior, as the definition considered above requires.  Because the law is 
unconcerned with status per se, the criminality or immorality of simply being an addict will not be 
addressed. 
 94. The major exception will be cases in which the addict offends while in a state of 
unconsciousness or blackout induced by substance use.  Most jurisdictions would permit only limited 
use of such evidence to negate mens rea and some would not permit it at all.  The Supreme Court has 
declared constitutional the total exclusion of intoxication evidence, even when it is undeniably relevant 
and probative of culpability.  Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996). 
 95. JEANNETTE KENNETT, AGENCY AND RESPONSIBILITY: A COMMON-SENSE MORAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 134–35 (2001). 
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state of intense craving, they are capable of rationality in refractory periods and 
have a duty to take steps to avoid future offending. 
Both theories are potentially subject to the same objection, however.  
Addiction can become an entire lifestyle and the consequences of prolonged 
use of substances can so debilitate addicts physically and psychosocially that 
some addicts have exceptional difficulty at all times exercising substantial 
rationality concerning their status and behavior.  Although potential addicts 
may be aware of the risk of irrationality, they may not be fully aware of the risk 
of extreme irrationality that can arise in some cases.  In such cases, perhaps, one 
cannot find responsibility for extreme irrationality by referring back to pre-
addiction, knowing conduct, or by considering quiescent intervals.  In cases of 
extreme debilitation, the intervals between episodes of use may not be fully 
rational. 
The foregoing objection does not seem decisive, however.  First, in those 
few cases in which prolonged drug use produces a permanent, major mental 
disorder that compromises rationality at the time of criminal conduct, the addict 
will have available a traditional insanity defense based on  “settled insanity” 
resulting from the use of intoxicants.96  But except in such rare cases, most 
addicts’ rational intervals are probably sufficiently rational to hold them largely 
or fully responsible for diminishing their own rationality at the time of use or 
other drug-related crimes.  In addition, as a result of both street wisdom and 
personal history, experienced addicts typically know during these intervals both 
what treatment alternatives are available and the type of criminal behavior 
beyond seeking and using in which they are likely to engage.  Indeed, much of 
the further criminal activity probably takes place during the rational intervals 
and involves harm to others, which carries greater criminal penalties, giving the 
addict even stronger self- and other-regarding reasons not to offend than in the 
case of personal possession and use. 
Finally, suppose one concludes that some addicts deserve mitigation or 
excuse for at least some criminal conduct.  The previous subsection on the 
internal coercion theory suggests that irrationality would excuse any addict that 
the internal coercion theory might fairly excuse.  The argument, in brief, is this: 
A person driven crazy by fear is crazy.  Or, in the alternative, people so fearful 
of mild dysphoric states that they appear incapable of bucking up when 
reasonable people would are irrationally fearful.  Any plausible story about 
allegedly compulsive cravings motivating the criminal conduct, especially in 
cases of serious crime, also will be a story in which the addict is less than fully 
rational or not rational at all.  In such cases, irrationality would be the 
appropriate excusing claim; there would be no need to resort to problematic 
internal coercion. 
 
 96. It is assumed that almost all jurisdictions would permit this defense for cases in which the 
settled insanity resulted from illicit drugs.  See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 481–82 (4th ed. 
2003). 
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The conclusion is that most addicts are responsible for seeking and using 
and almost none should be excused for further criminal activity, and especially 
not for serious wrongdoing.  There are simply too many periods of rationality 
and there is simply too much awareness of alternative possibilities to permit 
excuse in more than a small number of cases.97 
C. “Social Responsibility” 
Socioeconomic arrangements, culture, life stories, legal regulation, and 
other “external” causal variables can seem much to blame for addiction and its 
consequences.  Even if most addicts are responsible for becoming addicted and 
for their behavior while addicted, whether one becomes an addict and how one 
lives as an addict are not solely due to the intentional conduct of an agent who 
becomes an addict. 
Consider the following examples.  It is entirely understandable that people 
living in communities of deprivation, with few life chances, may find a life of 
addiction preferable to the misery of an impoverished straight life.  Some 
subcultures particularly encourage and celebrate the use of potentially addictive 
substances, increasing the risk of addiction among members of that subculture.  
For those who have lived lives of desperation or who suffer from psychological 
miseries for any reason, substance use can be a welcome escape.  Finally, legal 
regulation can affect the probability of addiction, the lifestyles of addicts, and 
the further behavioral consequences of addiction.  It is more difficult to bum a 
dime bag than to bum a smoke or to cadge a free drink, even from friends, and 
the addict can never be sure that a dealer is not an undercover narc, an 
informant, or cutting the dope.  Lawful availability and price affect rates of 
consumption, the development of informal customs and conventions for 
controlled use, the health, safety, and legal dangers of seeking and using drugs, 
and the probability that other criminal behavior beyond possession and use will 
occur as a result of addiction.  Explanations such as these, especially when 
considered in the context of a sympathy-arousing life history, can tug at our 
hearts and influence our responsibility attributions.  As Gary Watson concluded 
in his discussion of the case of a murderer who had suffered a dreadful 
childhood, in many cases our reaction will be, “No wonder.”98 
How should we respond to powerful social explanations?  Social variables 
account undeniably for a great deal of the variance in addictions and related 
 
 97. Part IX.A infra considers the case for mitigation in more detail.  This part also suggests that 
current criminal law overcriminalizes much drug-related activity.  Even if addicts might be responsible 
for that activity, it does not follow that it is sensible to criminalize it. 
 98. Gary Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme, in 
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 256, 275 
(Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987).  Watson’s description is of the life of Robert Alton Harris, a 
notorious multiple murderer who seemed to have no empathy for other people.  Indeed, his cellblock 
mates on death row detested him.  Yet if one reads his life history, it is difficult not to have at least a 
modicum of sympathy for Harris and to think that a dreadful outcome was entirely understandable for 
reasons in no way Harris’ fault.  Id. 
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behavior, and many of these variables are potentially modifiable by sound 
social policy.  For example, millions of lives will be affected by resolution of the 
current debates concerning decriminalization of illicit drugs,99 differential 
penalties for essentially similar substances such as crack and powdered cocaine, 
the propriety of needle exchanges, and whether nicotine should be regulated by 
the Food and Drug Administration.  A just society should try to minimize the 
inevitable ill effects of its policies.  Nonetheless, crimes and moral wrongs are 
ultimately committed by individual agents, and social causal variables, or any 
other kind of causal variables, cannot excuse addicts who are individually 
responsible without threatening all individual responsibility.100 
All behavior is caused by innumerable variables over which we have no 
control.  Some causal stories surely arouse more sympathy than others, but 
sympathy and an unfortunate life history are not excusing conditions per se.  
One may wish to consider such variables for disposition on consequential 
grounds or as an expression of mercy, but they do not excuse unless they 
produce sufficient irrationality or a sufficiently hard choice.  Focusing on 
individual responsibility should not blind us to the remediable causes of 
wrongdoing and should not diminish justifiable sympathy for wrongdoers, but 
neither should explanations and sympathy undermine our view that most 
wrongdoers are responsible agents. 
IX 
PROPOSALS: DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY,  
DRUG TREATMENT, & SENSIBLE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Three potential legal reforms might produce more proportionate blame and 
punishment for addiction-related offenses and might reduce addiction-
associated costs overall.  First, the criminal law should adopt a generic partial 
excuse to crime that might well apply to cases of addiction-related crime.  
Second, forced treatment of addicts using the leverage of the criminal law 
would be fair and likely to be effective.  Last, sensible criminalization policy in 
response to addiction and addiction-related crime would have profound effects. 
A. Diminished Responsibility 
Some addicts might not be responsible for seeking and use or for further 
drug-related or drug-affected activity because they are not rational or not fully 
rational, or perhaps, because they faced a sufficiently hard choice.  This would 
certainly be true if morality and the law held a less demanding set of criteria for 
responsibility than now obtains.  How could the law respond to such claims? 
 
 99. See infra Part IX. 
 100. See Stephen J. Morse, Deprivation and Desert, in FROM CRIMINAL JUSTICE TO SOCIAL 
JUSTICE 114 (William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000) (considering and rejecting the various 
theories proposed to excuse criminal behavior solely on the basis of an unfortunate life history). 
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According to almost any definition, rationality and hard choice are 
continuum concepts.101  Consequently, responsibility must be a matter of infinite 
variation.  But even if rationality is easier to assess than irresistibility, it is 
beyond human ability to measure it precisely enough to ascribe infinite degrees 
of responsibility.  As a result, the law adopts bright-line tests, such as legal 
insanity, and does not include a generic partial responsibility doctrine.102  The 
law should consider a limited, generic partial excuse of “partial 
responsibility.”103  Although there are practical objections that might fairly be 
raised, the moral claim for a partial excuse is sufficiently weighty to justify 
bearing the potential practical costs. 
As the extant, mitigating doctrines of homicide imply, some legally 
responsible defendants suffer from impaired rationality that warrants mitigation 
and triers of fact can fairly make the relatively gross culpability judgment 
required.  The underlying theory of excuse that supports these doctrines—
impaired capacity for rationality—and the doctrines themselves are perfectly 
generalizable to all crimes.  There is no reason that juries could not reasonably 
make the same judgments about mitigation for other crimes that they routinely 
make to determine if murder should be reduced to manslaughter. 
Justice would be better served if the criminal law adopted a generic partial 
excuse, reflected in another possible verdict, “Guilty but Partially Responsible” 
(GPR).  Many crimes are committed when the defendant’s rationality may be 
substantially impaired by a wide variety of factors, including the cognitive and 
affective changes that addiction may produce.  Fairness may demand mitigation 
in such cases, but except within homicide or at sentencing, the criminal law has 
no means to do justice, and the existing means suffer from various deficiencies.  
A verdict such as GPR would provide a remedy.  Because GPR would be a 
partial affirmative defense, the Constitution would permit the state to place the 
burden of persuasion on either the prosecution or the defense.104 
Any formula that expressed the central mitigating notion would work as 
long as it addressed the underlying, normative excusing condition, used 
 
 101. For ease of exposition, only rationality will be discussed.  The argument applies equally well, 
however, to an internal coercion or a so-called volitional theory of excuse. 
 102. The major exceptions are the mitigating doctrines of homicide that reduce murder to 
manslaughter and sentencing practices generally. 
 103. See Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 289 (2003) (providing a full defense of a proposal for a generic partial excuse to crime and 
considering the practical objections). 
 104. See Patterson v. New York, 423 U.S. 197 (1977).  It is important to distinguish GPR from 
“Guilty But Mentally Ill” (GBMI), a verdict adopted by a substantial minority of the states.  GBMI 
reflects a jury finding that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the crime, but that the 
defendant was nonetheless fully responsible for her conduct.  A GBMI defendant receives no necessary 
reduction in sentence—indeed, in some jurisdictions capital punishment may be imposed—nor does it 
guarantee treatment for the defendant that otherwise would not have been available.  Thus, unlike 
GPR, it is not a mitigating (or excusing) “defense.”  Indeed, it is not a defense at all.  In my opinion, 
GBMI is a useless, confusing alternative that impermissibly allows juries to avoid finding a defendant 
not guilty by reason of insanity in cases in which legal insanity appears justified.  GBMI is like “Guilty 
But Hepatitis.” 
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common-sense terms, and was not tied to any limiting model of why a 
defendant suffered from the requisite disturbance.  As studies of the insanity 
defense have shown, the words of the test are not crucial.105  Juries just need 
some formulation roughly to guide their normative judgment. 
Sentencing partially responsible defendants is a critical issue.  Although 
such defendants may be less culpable, in many cases the defendant’s impaired 
rationality may present a continuing, substantial danger.  Ex-addicts often 
relapse and return to addictive lifestyles that may involve related, dangerous 
criminal conduct, especially if they return to the setting in which the addictive 
activity previously occurred.  Unless a purely retributivist theory governs 
punishment—in which case, punishment must be strictly proportional only to 
desert—a sensible, legislatively mandated sentencing scheme must try to 
balance culpability and public safety interests.  The legislature should set a fixed 
reduction in sentence for GPR.  But however the reduction is characterized, 
applying it would be no different in principle from the penalty reduction from 
murder to manslaughter or from the sentence reduction for mitigation that a 
judge might order.  Moreover, if the reduction were legislatively mandated, and 
assuming the continued importance of plea bargaining, its application would be 
more consistent than if it were left to pure judicial discretion.  Again, any 
reasonable scheme would do. 
This proposal would lump together defendants of disparately impaired 
rationality, and consequently, different responsibility.  This may seem to be a 
denial of equal justice, but it results inevitably from the epistemological 
difficulties confronting more fine-grained assessments.  To permit many degrees 
of partial excuse and corresponding degrees of punishment reduction would 
require juries and judges to make judgments with a precision beyond the 
capacity of both our moral theories and our ability to understand the necessary 
facts.  Confusion and arbitrary decisions, rather than more justice, would follow 
from attempts at greater exactitude.  If GPR were adopted, defendants in 
general would have the potential to obtain just mitigation that is not currently 
available for most.  The failure to provide perfect justice in this imperfect world 
is not a decisive, or even a weighty objection in this instance. 
In sum, GPR might be the fairest way to respond to the diminished 
rationality claims that some addicts and others present as a partial excuse to 
crime.  If adopted, the law might have more flexibility in responding than under 
the current all-or-none approach, whereby few addicts could claim complete 
non-responsibility.  Nothing in this scheme would prevent the law from also 
 
 105. RITA J. SIMON & DAVID E. AARONSON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
OF LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-HINCKLEY ERA 125–27 (1988) (demonstrating on the basis of 
vignette methodology that the insanity defense test used made little difference in jury verdicts); HENRY 
J. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM 8, 
45–62 (1993) (demonstrating using California data that the test for legal insanity made little difference 
in operation of the insanity defense and jury verdicts). 
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offering voluntary treatment, and, perhaps, from imposing treatment on 
addicted and partially excused criminals. 
B. Drug Treatment 
Successful treatment of addictive states would immensely reduce the 
personal and social costs of addiction.  But, alas, highly effective and safe 
treatments are not yet generally available for most substances.  The new 
biology, including increased understanding of genetics, has not yet led to major 
discoveries of successful biological interventions.106  Given the complex genetic 
basis for addiction, a simple gene therapy does not seem to be an imminently 
foreseeable possibility.  Other drugs, such as methadone or naltrexone, may 
help some addicts kick some addictions, but no one claims that these drugs cure 
the underlying pathophysiology or anatomical pathology.  That is, to the best of 
my knowledge, there is no evidence yet that these treatments reverse or 
ameliorate the brain changes that prolonged use allegedly produces.  Better 
understanding of the biological mechanisms of addiction has not produced 
magic bullets.  Even abstinence for long periods of time, with or without 
treatment, does not guarantee that compulsive seeking and use will not recur.  
If the brain disease model is right, prolonged use changes brain structure and 
function, but prolonged abstinence following addiction does not make the brain 
normal again, or at least, not normal enough.  Although the brain is famously 
resilient, the brain disease model implies that prolonged drug use is an 
apparently exceptional insult that changes the brain permanently for the worse. 
Despite the basic biological advances, the most successful general treatment 
strategies to date have been behavioral and social, including the quasi- (and 
not-so-quasi-) religious regimens associated with Alcoholics Anonymous and 
the like.107  Indeed, self-efficacy is the crucial variable in preventing  
 
 106. See, e.g., TEXTBOOK OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, supra note 56, at Part III, Treatment 
for Specific Drugs of Abuse.  This authoritative text has chapters on the treatment of all specific drugs 
of abuse.  Successful biological treatments are rare and virtually never are sufficient by themselves.  But 
see COMM. TO IDENTIFY STRATEGIES TO RAISE THE PROFILE OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND 
ALCOHOLISM RESEARCH, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, DISPELLING THE MYTHS ABOUT ADDICTION: 
STRATEGIES TO INCREASE UNDERSTANDING AND STRENGTHEN RESEARCH 73–87(1997) (stating a 
more optimistic view based on recent research, but still admitting limited effectiveness and substantial 
knowledge gaps).  Charles P. O’Brien is considerably more optimistic about the possibility of using 
naltrexone in a long-acting depot form to treat opioid addiction.  Letter from Charles P. O’Brien, M.D., 
Ph.D., Department of Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania to Stephen J. Morse (Sept. 17, 2003) (on 
file with the author); see also James W. Cornish, David Metzger, George Woody, David Wilson, A. 
Thomas McLellan, Barry Vandergrift & Charles P. O’Brien, Naltrexone Pharmacotherapy for Opioid 
Dependent Federal Probationers, 14 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 529 (1997) (reporting a 
successful naltrexone treatment program in a small and non-random sample of federal probationers); 
see generally Charles P. O’Brien, Anticraving Medications for Relapse Prevention: A Possible New Class 
of Psychoactive Medications 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1423 (2005) (reviewing anticraving treatments); 
Frank J. Vocci, Jane Acri & Ahmed Elkashef, Medication Development for Addictive Disorders: The 
State of the Science 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1432 (2005) (reviewing the development of 
pharmacotherapies for several substance abuse disorders). 
 107. See, e.g., TEXTBOOK OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, supra note 56, at 151–321 (detailing 
treatments for specific drugs); David Ball, Genetic approaches to alcohol dependence, 185 BRIT. J. 
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relapse.108  Those committed to the primarily biological model do not deny the 
importance of behavioral variables and of social context and cues.  Keeping the 
addict away from the setting in which use typically occurs is powerfully 
prophylactic, for example.  Nonetheless, these methods too have limited 
efficacy. 
We should be modest about treatment efficacy, but treatment can be 
helpful, and, reasonably presumably, increasingly effective biological and 
psychosocial treatment methods for addictions will become available.  For 
example, biomedical research might develop an opioid antagonist that is safer 
and more easily administered than naltrexone.  Should such treatments be 
offered voluntarily to addicts within the control of the criminal justice system 
(and to addicts not under such control) and may it be imposed on addicts who 
will not consent to treatment? 
Assuming that resources to treat addicts are available without diminishing 
resources for other, more worthy goals, social justice plausibly requires that 
society try to help people who suffer from conditions that debilitate their own 
lives and are costly to the lives of others, especially if such people are 
imprisoned and thus entirely under the state’s control.109  Moreover, substances 
play such a large role in criminal behavior that it simply makes good sense to try 
to reduce the costs of drug- and addiction-related crime through treatment. 
The more difficult question is whether the state may impose treatment, 
either forcibly or by coercive practices.  The Supreme Court has held that 
prisoners have a liberty interest in avoiding unwanted psychotropic drug 
treatment, but that the state may override that interest and treat prisoners 
involuntarily if treatment is medically warranted and necessary to insure the 
safety of the inmate or others in the institution.110  Probably few addicts in prison 
would qualify for involuntary treatment based on substance disorder alone,111 
but could the state offer better conditions in prison or shorter prison terms to 
induce addicted prisoners to enter drug treatment programs?  Could prisoners 
give informed consent to such treatment?  Would such conditions violate ethical 
or constitutional prohibitions because they were too coercive and would 
coercive programs be effective even if they were ethically and legally 
acceptable?  Many believe that such conditions are implicitly and unacceptably 
coercive and that informed consent is impossible in such circumstances.  
Therefore, unless the state has a sufficiently strong interest to override the 
 
PSYCHIATRY 449, 450 (2004) (“Psychiatric genetics has yet to deliver on its early promise and it has not 
yielded any major advance in the management of people who are alcohol-dependent.”). 
 108. C. Robert Cloninger, Genetics of Substance Abuse, in TEXTBOOK OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
TREATMENT, supra note 56, at 73, 78–79. 
 109. This point is weakly stated as only a “plausible claim,” even though it is my belief, because 
what social justice demands is notoriously controversial.  Many might deny the premise about resources 
or claim that prisoners have the least strong claim in our society to limited social resources.  For such 
people, only consequential arguments might be persuasive. 
 110. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
 111. Many addicts, of course, suffer from co-morbidities, and it is possible that such treatment might 
be permissible based on non-addiction disorders. 
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prisoner’s liberty interest in avoiding unwanted treatment, such treatment 
cannot be employed. 
Coercion is a notoriously fraught concept.  The most common account 
distinguishes between offers, which are thought to increase freedom and are 
thus not coercive, and threats, which decrease freedom and are potentially 
coercive. 112  The problem is to distinguish the two, which is difficult to do except 
against a political and moral baseline that will itself be contestable.  For 
example, assume that a person is lying injured and helpless by the side of the 
road.  A physician arrives, identifies herself as a doctor, and asks if she can be of 
assistance.  The injured person asks the doctor to help.  The doctor responds 
that she will do so for a fee.  If physicians have a duty in that society to help in 
such circumstances without a fee, then the response is a threat; if physicians 
have no such duty, then the response is an offer.  Many cases cannot be so 
neatly distinguished, however, and whether physicians should have to offer 
services without a fee in such case is a controversial moral and political 
question.  Assuming that the baseline can be justified and the case can be 
identified as a threat, another difficult question is how serious the threat must 
be to be deemed unacceptably coercive.  For example, assume that everyone 
has a right not to be touched without consent.  Suppose a malefactor says that 
she will touch you without your permission unless you kill an innocent 
bystander.  The case is clearly one of threat, but the situation would be 
insufficiently coercive to satisfy the criteria for duress that might excuse a 
threatened agent who does wrong in response.  The criterion of “sufficient 
threat,” although standard, is contestable and under-determinative.  
Nonetheless, it can help clarify the coerciveness of drug treatment programs. 
In McKune v. Lile, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the 
conditions accompanying a prison treatment program for sex offenders were 
coercive and unconstitutional.113  The treatment program was voluntary, but it 
required all participants to confess without immunity to any prior uncharged 
sex offenses that they may have committed.  Although no participant had ever 
been subsequently charged for an uncharged but confessed offense, it was a 
theoretical possibility.  If a sex offender refused to participate, he was subject to 
much harsher prison conditions than those who did participate.  The Supreme 
Court held that the program did not violate the prisoner’s Fifth Amendment 
rights and was not coercive.114  Although the Court rejected a threat/offer mode 
of analysis, the holding was based on the argument that the state had a right to 
impose the harsher conditions in the absence of a treatment program, so the 
situation was not coercive.  Thus, it appears that the best explanation for the 
Court’s holding is that the program was an offer, not a threat. 
 
 112. Wertheimer offers a particularly complete account of the various legal and philosophical 
approaches in addition to his own theory.  See WERTHEIMER, supra note 70. 
 113. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002). 
 114. Id. 
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By analogy to McKune, it seems that the state can to some undetermined 
extent use the leverage of the criminal justice system to induce an otherwise 
unwilling prisoner to enter a treatment program.  Indeed, the acceptance of 
much current mental health treatment is motivated by various forms of leverage 
used by the state’s agents.115  And there is no clear evidence that arguably or 
undeniably coercive treatment is ineffective.116  Given the costs that addicts 
impose on our society, there will be strong pressure to find various inducements 
morally and constitutionally acceptable, especially if the treatments available 
are efficacious at reasonable cost in reducing drug-related criminal behavior. 
C. Sensible Criminalization Policy 
According to the dominant legal model of the person, the criminal law 
operates by providing rules and consequences for violating the rules that give 
potential miscreants good reasons not to offend.  The model assumes that the 
creatures to whom these reasons are addressed are generally capable of using 
them as premises in practical reasoning that should in most cases lead to the 
conclusion that the agent should not violate the law.  Of course, society is 
delighted if other forms of social control, such as internalized conscience and 
informal sanctions, also tend to limit criminal conduct. 
The question for the law is whether and to what degree we should 
criminalize drug-related offenses committed by addicts and non-addicts.  No 
sensible person thinks that the criminal law is sufficient to reduce the level of 
criminalized harms to acceptable levels in a world of morally imperfect beings 
who inhabit a non-police state.  Non-criminal justice approaches to addiction 
can be extremely useful, even if criminalization also can help.  There is no 
reason to believe that our thinking about addiction must be polar, that it is only 
brain disease or only intentional conduct, that it is best treated only medically 
or psychologically or only by criminalization.  Addiction-related conduct can be 
both a sign of brain disease and intentional action, both a proper subject for 
treatment and for moral judgment. 
No one suggests that we should criminalize and punish the status of being an 
addict.  Indeed, doing so would be unconstitutional.117  Moreover, failure to 
criminalize recreational substance use is no guarantee of an effective social 
response.  Two of the most addictive drugs, ethanol (alcohol) and nicotine, 
which cause untold personal and social harm, are entirely lawful, freely 
available, and relatively inexpensive.  The medical model’s preferred mode of 
response to seeking and using these lawful substances is largely unfettered by 
 
 115. John Monahan et al., Use of Leverage to Improve Adherence to Psychiatric Treatment in the 
Community, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 37, 37 (2005). 
 116. See John Monahan et al., Mandated Community Treatment: Beyond Outpatient Commitment, 
52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1198, 1199–1204 (2001) (citing evidence for efficacy of mandated outpatient 
treatment but querying whether legally mandated treatment is necessary to achieve this result). 
 117. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that criminal punishment solely for 
the status of being addicted is cruel and unusual and thus constitutionally impermissible under the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
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nasty criminalization, but the problems these substances cause remain grave.  
When people manage to quit—as many do—it is more a response to reason and 
self-efficacy generally than a result of medical or psychological intervention in 
the addicts’ brains or minds. 
Few people who adopt a unitary medical model suggest that production, 
possession, sale, and use of currently illicit drugs should be entirely 
decriminalized and deregulated.  Criminal justice apparently plays a necessary 
role concerning these drug activities.118  Seeking and using drugs are 
distinguishable from production, sale, and other criminal activities related to 
drug use.  Even if one desired on “medical grounds” to decriminalize possession 
for personal use and such use itself, few would argue further that we should 
decriminalize or deregulate production, possession for sale, sale itself, or other 
property and personal crimes that might be part of the drug life or necessary to 
support addiction.  Unless the authorities have some legal tool, such as the 
threat of criminal sanctions or enhanced punishment, to coerce users to accept 
treatment, many, perhaps most, will not do so willingly.  Most addicts already 
know the other good reasons they ought to enter treatment, but many engage in 
denial and other defense mechanisms that may prevent them from keeping such 
reasons present to their minds.  Finally, given the limited success of available 
treatment programs, the criminal justice response may ultimately be more 
effective at reducing drug use than providing treatment, and indeed, may 
protect liberty more than a paternalistic treatment approach.119  Indeed, some 
sophisticated observers believe that general decriminalization would produce 
catastrophic increases in addiction.120  The important questions, of course, are 
what the proper role of moral evaluation and criminal justice should be and 
whether this role is inconsistent with sensible medical responses, such as 
treatment.  Common sense suggests that all such approaches are not necessarily 
inconsistent and can be simultaneously and usefully employed. 
One reform that might do much to reduce both drug-related harms and 
criminal justice costs would be limited decriminalization of small amounts of 
substances possessed solely for personal use and simple use itself, coupled with 
enhanced enforcement of common, further drug-related harms.121  Consider by 
analogy our response to drunk driving.  Adult possession and use of alcohol is 
 
 118. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 528–31 (1968). 
 119. Id.  Writing for the plurality, Justice Marshall wrote that there might be deterrent and civil 
liberties virtues to using the criminal justice system to respond to the behavioral consequences of 
alcoholism.  Id.  We have learned a great deal about the causes and consequences of alcoholism since 
this 1968 opinion, but the reasoning is still applicable. 
 120. See James Q. Wilson, What To Do About Crime, 98 COMMENT. 25 (1994). 
 121. Proposing any form of decriminalization of currently illicit substances raises enormously 
complicated and extremely controversial issues.  For the purposes of this paper, however, the full 
argument cannot be produced.  I can only gesture superficially and conclusorily at the recommended 
approach.  For a balanced, data-driven analysis of the costs and benefits of decriminalization, see 
ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES: LEARNING FROM OTHER VICES, 
TIMES, & PLACES (2001).  See also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR 
RATIONAL DRUG CONTROL (1992). 
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not criminal, but the carnage produced by intoxicated drivers is well-
understood.  Prohibition would surely reduce the carnage, but, as we learned 
during our experiment with this approach, it produces vast harms of its own.  A 
potentially sensible approach would more strictly enforce laws against drunk 
driving, which is probably the most foreseeably dangerous alcohol-related 
behavior.  Similarly, limited decriminalization of currently illicit substances 
would probably not have catastrophic social effects and would almost certainly 
avoid the many appalling costs that our complete war on illicit substances now 
produces.  Using produces harms primarily to oneself and might be better 
approached medically than legally.  This regime certainly would facilitate 
voluntary seeking of treatment by addicts and others with drug problems. 
A second promising reform would be diversion from the criminal justice 
system of minor drug-related offenders coupled with treatment in cases in 
which treatment seems likely to be successful.122  The drug courts that have been 
established in many states are one attempt to provide such diversion and 
treatment.123  This approach is controversial for many of the reasons that 
involuntary treatment generally raises questions, but avoiding the necessity of 
costly imprisonment and inducing treatment for minor offenders engaged in 
drug-related criminal activities is potentially cost-effective, especially if more 
effective and safe treatment modalities become available. 
Limited decriminalization has much to recommend it as a solution to drug-
related problems.  Nevertheless, in the current climate of opinion concerning 
controlled substances, it seems very unlikely that Congress, whose power over 




Despite the exciting, undoubted advances in the biological understanding of 
addiction, and despite the plausibility of considering addictions diseases, the 
disease model does not and cannot fully explain addiction or inform social and 
legal policy concerning addiction.  Addiction inevitably involves human action 
and is therefore subject to moral evaluation.  Although addiction might cause a 
condition warranting mitigation or excuse, primarily by compromising 
rationality, there is good reason to believe that most addicts are responsible for 
 
 122. Douglas Longshore, Angela Hawken, Darren Urada & M. Douglas Anglin, SAPCA Cost 
Analysis Report (First and Second Years), available at http://www.uclaisap.org/prop36/documents/ 
SACPA_COSTANALYSIS.pdf at 21–23 (2006) (studying the costs and benefits of a legislatively-
mandated diversion program that offered probation and treatment to non-violent drug offenders found 
that incarceration costs were substantially reduced, that there were greater cost savings for some 
eligible offenders than for others, and that the program could be improved). 
 123. See generally DRUG COURTS: IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE (James L. Nolan, Jr. ed., 2002). 
 124. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (holding that Congress’s Commerce Clause 
authority includes the power to prohibit local cultivation and use of marijuana for medical purposes 
that is in compliance with state law). 
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seeking-and-using behavior and for other immoral or criminal activity related to 
addiction.  For those who may not be fully responsible, however, modification 
of the existing doctrines of mitigation and excuse would be necessary to 
respond fairly to the claims of diminished responsibility addicts might present.  
Finally, although the criminal justice system might play a useful role in 
responding to addiction-related action, non-criminal, non-judgmental 
interventions also should play a substantial role.  The criminal justice system 
response should be limited and reformed to enhance the potential efficacy of 
treatment approaches. 
XI 
POSTSCRIPT: BECOMING AN ADDICT 
Let us start with pre-addiction use.  Before they reach the age of reason, 
some children and many early and middle adolescents have substantial 
experience with alcohol, nicotine, and other drugs, and a small number of them 
become problem users.  Moreover, early experimentation with substances such 
as nicotine is highly predictive of later behavior that risks health.  Still, the 
simplifying assumption will be made that virtually all people do not have their 
first substantial experience with potentially addicting substances until they are 
mid-adolescents, an age at which adolescents are in general cognitively 
indistinguishable from adults.125 
By the age of reason, any competent person knows generally about the 
dangers of addicting substances.  Most people who use potentially addicting 
substances do not become addicts, but between fifteen and seventeen percent 
do.126  On the other hand, they may misestimate the risks of becoming addicted 
and especially underestimate how bad it will feel to be addicted.127  Experience 
with and empathy for those already addicted is simply no substitute for the real 
thing.  Consequently, perhaps addicts are not fully responsible for their 
addictions because they operate with insufficient information.  This claim 
appears plausible and not unlike one objection to advanced directives for health 
care.  For example, if one has never faced death or has never faced it while fully 
competent, how does the person know what she would really want under the 
circumstances?  Although plausible, this claim seems too strong.  There is 
sufficiently good information as a result of both observation and indirect 
sources about the perils of addiction to warrant the conclusion that those who 
take drugs understand the risks sufficiently to be held responsible if addiction 
 
 125. See Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 52–
56 (1997) (reviewing evidence that the formal reasoning powers of middle and late adolescents are 
indistinguishable from those of adults, but recognizing that there may be behavioral differences 
involving impulsiveness and susceptibility to peer pressure). 
 126. Deroche-Gamonet et al., supra note 33, at 1014.  The authors refer to this as a “small 
proportion” of those using, but it is hardly an insignificant risk of an injurious disorder and the number 
is surely higher in identifiable at-risk populations. 
 127. See ELSTER, supra note 51, at 185. 
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ensues.  After all, as long as people have general normative competence, 
including the ability to gather relevant information, perfect information is 
hardly required for responsibility. 
One can deny that any drug use is rational because all drug use is immoral 
and choosing immorality is always irrational.  Claiming generically that 
immorality is irrational is philosophically controversial, of course, and in this 
specific context it suggests a highly moralistic, virtue ethics.  Why, precisely, is 
limited experimentation immoral?  Because it feels good?  Does all such use 
degrade the moral personality?  Perhaps so.  But, after all, limited initial 
experience genuinely hooks almost no one—even if the experimental or 
recreational user is a member of a genetically or socially at-risk population and 
especially if the diagnostic brain changes almost always require repeated use.128 
The usual response to claims that experimentation is not necessarily 
irrational is that the process of addiction is insidious.  No single instance of use 
seems to cross a threshold; the process is instead stealthily additive, a slippery 
slope.  At some point, however, the addict is hooked without realizing it.  
Because no initial user can predict whether and when he or she specifically will 
become addicted, it is always irrational to start or to continue, even if one is not 
yet hooked.  There is truth to this response, but the insidiousness of the 
addiction process is well -known generally and proto-addicts are usually aware 
that they are developing a problem before the problem becomes a diagnosable 
addiction.  They may, of course, be “in denial” or using other defense 
mechanisms, such as rationalization, to avoid insight into their own conditions, 
but the use of defense mechanisms, an imperfect shield at best, is not an 
excusing condition that morality and law will recognize when serious harms 
occur.  Again, one need not act on perfect information to be responsible.  It is 
difficult to resist the conclusion that most and perhaps all use prior to addiction 
is conduct for which the user is responsible and has some awareness of the risk 
of potential addiction.  Consequently, it is also difficult to resist concluding that 
most addicts are responsible for becoming addicted. 
Most addictions probably occur as a result of conscious and not-so-conscious 
indifference to the risk of becoming addicted, but plausibly it may be rational in 
some cases to choose intentionally to become an addict and to enter the 
addictive “life.”  This claim should be distinguished from the controversial 
arguments made by Gary Becker and others that addiction is itself rational.129  
My argument is that it can be rational to choose to become irrational, assuming, 
arguendo, that at least some addicts are irrational about their lives when they 
are addicted. 
 
 128. Peter W. Kalivas & Nora D. Volkow, The Neural Basis of Addiction: A Pathology of 
Motivation and Choice, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1403, 1405–06 (2005) (finding repeated use of 
addictive drugs induces structural changes in neural circuitry). 
 129. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Rational Addiction, in ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 50 
(1996). 
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Imagine a young person who has lived an extraordinarily deprived life and 
who therefore has little human capital and few prospects.  It is possible that the 
person could acquire the life skills and education needed to beat the odds, but 
rational calculation would suggest that the odds are overwhelmingly against 
success.  In such circumstances, one can easily imagine that a life of intermittent 
“highs” or oblivion, for example, would be preferable to a clean, straight life, 
despite the threat of poverty, disease, and prison.  Such a life would be a limited 
but manageable, employing substances to help ignore or alleviate the misery of 
existence.  Choosing such a life would be quite rational.130 
Even if consciously risking or intentionally choosing to become an addict is 
not rational behavior, responsibility for conduct does not require acting for 
good, rational reasons.  It is sufficient that the agent retain the general capacity 
for rationality.  Until addiction occurs—and perhaps thereafter—there is little 
reason to believe that otherwise responsible agents do not retain this general 
capacity. 
Finally, few people are compelled to become addicted.  Peer pressure to 
experiment may be common in adolescence and early adulthood, but it seldom 
takes a form that would justify a compulsion excuse.  First use is almost always 
intentional and in most cases rational, because virtually no one is immediately 
hooked or harmed.  The user tries the substance to please friends, for the thrill 
of experimenting or being on the edge, for the pleasure or arousal the substance 
produces, and for a host of other reasons that do not suggest excusing 
irrationality.  Moreover, almost no one is literally forced to become an addict by 
the involuntary administration of substances.131 
In conclusion, most people who become addicts may fairly be held 
responsible to a substantial degree for becoming addicted.  To the extent that 
addicts seek to use their addiction as a mitigating or excusing circumstance 
when they are charged with crimes related to the addiction, they become 
vulnerable to the claim that they have caused the condition of their own excuse 
and, therefore, should not be excused.  This is a form of strict liability, however, 
and becoming an addict is distinguishable from committing crimes once one is 
addicted.  Indeed, in some cases, such as adherence to a properly prescribed 
regime of addictive analgesics, becoming addicted may be entirely lawful.  The 
better reason to hold most addicts criminally responsible most of the time—
however they became addicted—is that most of the time they retain a sufficient 
capacity for rationality to be held responsible.132 
 
 130. Although addicts may be largely responsible for becoming addicts and also responsible for 
much of their drug-related activity while addicted, our society should try to help change the odds for 
those in my not-hypothetical example. 
 131. Infants born to addicted mothers might be an exception, but this exceptional case does not 
undermine the general argument. 
 132. See supra Part VIII.B.2. 
